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Abstract 
 
The dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay investigates if market illiquidity is 
a significant determinant of capital structure decisions. We hypothesize that firms would 
likely compare the illiquidity of two sources of external funding at a given point in time and 
issue the one with lower illiquidity. Therefore, if the level of illiquidity is a key driver of 
firms’ capital structure decisions in that year, the higher the level of stocks illiquidity, the 
more of its financing needs are satisfied by the issuance of debt, and the higher the level of 
bonds illiquidity, the less of its financing needs are satisfied by the issuance of debt. We find 
that illiquidity of the two sources of external funding affects significantly the capital structure 
decisions of U.S. firms over the sample period 2003-2018. Specifically, the coefficient of 
relative bonds illiquidity is negative, large, and strongly significant regardless of leverage 
measurement, and the coefficient of relative stocks illiquidity is positive, large, and strongly 
significant regardless of leverage measurement. 
The second essay investigates if markets illiquidity is a significant determinant of 
investment decisions. We argue that an increase in investment opportunities due to an 
increase in bonds liquidity is for the decrease of the firm’s cost of capital and the decrease in 
its issuance cost. With a lower cost of capital and a higher ability to issue securities, firms are 
able to undertake more investment opportunities. We find that bonds and stocks illiquidity 
affect significantly the investment decisions of U.S. firms over the sample period 2003-2018.  
Specifically, the coefficients of bonds and stocks illiquidity are negative, large, and strongly 
significant regardless of investment measurement. Also, we find the effect of bonds 
illiquidity is more pronounced for financially constrained firms using different financial 
constraints measures.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Capital structure, Investment opportunities, stocks illiquidity, bonds illiquidity
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Chapter one 
Impact of Relative Liquidity of Stocks and Bonds on the Financing decisions 
 
1. Introduction and hypotheses development 
 
Market frictions like bonds and stocks illiquidity increase the cost of debt and stock issuance. 
However, illiquidity may not necessarily occur simultaneously. Consequently, firms would likely 
compare the illiquidity of two sources of external funding at a given point in time and issue the one 
with lower illiquidity. If such behavior persists in firms’ decision to raise money externally, we 
should find a firm’s capital structure decision to be an accumulation of past financing decisions, 
similar to the market timing theory, contradicting the trade-off theory.  In this essay, we empirically 
test this proposition. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of market friction 
of bonds illiquidity on leverage while taking into account the other main market friction, stock 
illiquidity.  
Illiquidity or trading costs are critically considered in many investment and financial 
decisions. Amihud and Mandelson (1986) define illiquidity as the cost of immediate execution since 
the offer price comprises a buying premium and the bid price includes a sale discount.  They indicate 
that a natural measure of illiquidity is the spread between the bids and asks prices. 
1.1 Market timing theory of leverage 
 
Market timing theory of leverage hypothesizes that security issuance decisions depend on 
market performance. Managers, aiming to maximize shareholders wealth, have the ability to identify 
the times when issuing security is less costly. Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that capital structure 
is the result of mangers’ efforts to time the market. The variation of adverse selection costs across 
firms or across time would induce firms to issue equity when book-to-market or adverse selection is 
low. In fact, Anton Miglo (2010) indicates that the evidences provide a support to the market timing 
theory in that managers postpone securities issuance until the market conditions enhanced. 
Illiquidity makes securities’ issuance costly because it is a reflection of the frictions in the 
trading environment and is a major determinant of risk. Many papers find that bonds with similar 
characteristics and high illiquidity would show greater yield spreads. Also, theoretical work by 
Merton (1987) and O’Hara (2003) suggest that illiquidity is priced in the market. In addition, 
Amihud (2002) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) among others find that illiquidity is a major price 
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factor in the market. Chen et al. (2007) find that illiquidity is priced in firm’s bonds yield spreads. 
Constantinides (1986) and Lo et al (2004) argue that market illiquidity decreases investors’ ability to 
hedge risk, leading investors to demand a premium, which would consequently increase the cost of 
external financing. 
Also, illiquidity makes securities’ issuance costly because it is an indication of high adverse 
selection. Bagehot (1971) proposes a distinction between informed traders hoping to gain from their 
advantageous information in trading with the uninformed traders. Easley and O’Hara (1987) develop 
a model of the bids-asks spread, which has a positive correlation with information asymmetry and 
asset value uncertainty. Market proxies of adverse selection are based on the notion that market 
illiquidity is a function of three main components: order processing, inventory, and adverse 
selection. The idea here is that an increase in illiquidity works as a compensation for dealing with 
informed traders and rises with the degree of adverse selection. Easley et al. (1996, 1997), and 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2004) show that adverse selection measured by either the bid-ask 
spread or trading volume is a significant factor in determining market liquidity.  
A number of statistical models were developed to proxy for an asset’s liquidity. Some models 
try to make inference from the autocovariance of consecutive asset returns like Roll’s (1984) and 
Boa, pan and Wang (BPW, hereafter) (2011). Others try to make inference based on the interaction 
between trading volume and asset returns like the price impact measure of Amihud (2002).  
The market timing theory of leverage suggests that the presence of variation of adverse 
selection costs across firms would induce firms to issue securities when adverse selection is low. 
Also, the pecking order theory of leverage by Myers and Majluf (1984) proposes that asymmetric 
information affects firms’ preferences of funding sources. It states that firms prefer internal finance, 
but if external finance is required, firms issue debt first and issue equity as the last resort. However, 
Halov and Heider (2004) claim that the traditional pecking order is a unique case of adverse 
selection. When the adverse selection is related to the firm value, the standard pecking order is 
applicable and firms prefer to issue debt instead of equity. However, when the adverse selection is 
related to firm’s risk, firms prefer to issue equity instead of debt. Thus, the preference for external 
debt or external equity depends on whether adverse selection is related to value or risk.  
Therefore, high market illiquidity is an indication of the increase in market’s risk and in 
adverse selection, and hence would cause securities’ underpricing and higher issuance costs. Butler et 
al (2005) provide evidence that there is a negative correlation between investment bank fees and 
stock liquidity. Also, Lipson and Mortal (2009) investigate the correlation between stocks liquidity 
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and equity issuance, and find that firms with high stocks liquidity have lower issuance costs, and 
therefore they use more funding through the issue of shares; consequently, firms end up with lower 
levels of leverage. Corwin (2003) finds that underpricing in seasoned equity offerings is negatively 
correlated with some measures of market liquidity. In addition, Hong and Stein (2007) by using 
disagreement models show that illiquidity is positively associated to underpricing.  Therefore, based 
on the market timing theory of leverage, the security issuance decision when market exhibits high 
illiquidity is disadvantageous for firms and shareholders wealth since illiquidity increases the issuance 
cost. 
In fact, transactions costs are essential in the academic debate about firms’ capital structure. 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Auerbach (1985), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1995), Opler and Titman 
(1994) and others cite transactions costs as the reason for firms to delay adjusting their leverage 
ratios and thus cause a deviation from their target ratios. Also, Huang and Ritter (2009) show that 
firms’ choice among equity and public debt is related to the relative cost of issuance. Moreover, 
Graham and Harvey (2000) observe that firms take transactions costs into their consideration when 
making debt issuance decisions especially among small firms. Similarly, Titman and Wessels (1988) 
observe that small firms use comparatively little debt and cite this as evidence that transaction costs 
decrease debt issuance among small firms.  
Moreover, Bharath et al (2009) find that information asymmetry measured by stocks 
illiquidity is a significant factor in determining capital structure decisions, as argued by the pecking 
order theory. Also, Faulkender and Petersen (2005) show that firms with more access to bonds 
market, as measured by having a debt rating, have significantly more leverage.  
However, these studies do not directly test for the association between bonds illiquidity and 
leverage ratios or include both markets liquidities in the same model. Graham (2000) argues that 
some firms are significantly below the optimal leverage ratio and missing the opportunity to increase 
their value by adding more debt and hence decreasing their tax payments. The assumption here is 
that firms are willingly deciding to leave money on the table. However, another justification is that 
firms are incapable of increasing their leverage due to market frictions like illiquidity. Therefore, 
investigating if financial markets’ illiquidity influences corporate behavior is important since market 
imperfections play a big role in determining the financing and investment decisions of firms.  
To sum up, trade-off theory suggests that firms rebalance their capital structure with a goal 
to maintain optimal capital structure. However, pecking order theory does not recognize optimal 
capital structure and asserts that financing behavior follows a pecking order. Also, market timing 
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theory argument suggests that leverage is the cumulative result of past financing decisions (issuing 
stocks when prices are high) and this effect is permanent. Therefore, pecking order and market 
timing theory are inconsistent with the trade-off theory and do not assume optimality.  Market 
timing theory is also inconsistent with the Pecking Order theory in that the firms do not go for debt 
financing before they issue stock financing.  
Our suggestion is that firms’ financing decision follows the following path: firms exploit 
their internal fund initially, inconsistent with the trade-off but consistent with the first part of the 
pecking order that firms prefer internal financing to external financing; then when doing external 
financing, firms examine the illiquidity of the bonds market versus the illiquidity of the stocks 
market, and issue the one with less illiquidity, inconsistent with both trade-off and pecking order, 
and more in line with timing market theory. Consequently, the relative importance of external 
financing’s illiquidity has an opposing effect of firm’s leverage ratio.  An increase in bonds illiquidity 
relevant to stock illiquidity, has a negative influence on leverage since it increases stock issuance (the 
denominator). While an increase in stocks illiquidity relevant to bonds illiquidity, has a positive 
influence on leverage since it increases bonds issuance (the numerator).  
Therefore, the higher the degree of relative illiquidity of a given type of security, the greater 
is the firm’s incentive to issue the other type, all else held constant. Thus, we hypothesize the 
following:  
Hypothesis a. An increase in the level of the relative firm’s bonds illiquidity, the less of its 
financing needs are met by the issuance of debt. 
 Hypothesis b. An increase in the level of the relative firm’s stocks illiquidity, the more of its 
financing needs are met by the issuance of debt.  
1.2 Effect of different firm’s financial constraints 
 
More financially constrained firms would have a high-pronounced effect of bonds illiquidity. 
The relaxation of financial constraints means that firms have more internal funds or easier excess to 
equity market, which consequently makes the bonds market and its imperfections irrelevant. 
Conversely, firms with more financially constraints will benefit more from the bonds liquidity, as it 
makes it easier for them to borrow externally. Thus, we expect the effect of bonds illiquidity is to be 
more pronounced on financially constrained firms due to the limited access for other external 
capital. 
To capture the effect of financial constraints and to reassure that our main results are not 
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driven by the choice of a single variable, we use firm size, Kaplan and Zingales (1997)’s index (KZ 
index, hereafter), following Fazzari et al., (1988), Almedia et al., (2004), and Alhassan et al. (2017). 
On an annual basis, we rank firms by the financial constraint variable into four quartiles. Then, we 
create a dummy variable that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top quartile and zero otherwise. 
This dummy represents firms in the highest quartile. We will test the hypothesis by adding to the 
base specification the financial constraint dummy interacted with the bonds illiquidity variable. A 
significant coefficient would indicate that illiquidity is more relevant for firms with greater financial 
constraints.  
The first financial constraint is firm size. Almedia et al. (2004) argue that small firms are 
more vulnerable to capital market imperfections since they are less known. Beck et al. (2008) show 
evidence that there is a difference in funding between firms based on their size, making small firms 
more susceptible to financial constraints.  Therefore, small firms should be more sensitive to bonds 
illiquidity.  An interacted dummy between illiquidity and small firms is added to the base regression, 
and it should be significant and negative as evidence that the effect of illiquidity is bigger and more 
effective for small firms since they have less access to capital. 
KZ index is introduced by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and has been used to proxy financial 
constraints in many related studies (Almeida et al (2004); Alhassan et al. (2017); and others). The KZ 
index is constructed from the following equation:  
KZ=-1.002 FCF+0.283 Qratio+3.139 Leverage –39.368 Dividend -1.315 Cash.  
Therefore, the interaction variable should be negative and significant, indicating a higher 
sensitivity form the financially constrained firms to the effect of illiquidity.  
Therefore, the effect of bonds illiquidity is more pronounced on financial constrained firms 
due to the limited access for external capital. 
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2. Data  
 
We use annual data from 2003-2018. Our sample includes all nonfinancial firm observations 
in the Compustat database between 2003 and 2018. We end up with 1,176 firms. We employ S&P’s 
credit rating to classify firms, where firms rated BBB – or higher are investment-grade firms and 
firms rated BB+ or lower are below- investment-grade firms. 
We estimate a fixed effect panel model, following the standard approach popular in many 
previous papers. The use of panel data analysis allows us to better control for firm heterogeneity and 
reduce the issue of multicollinearity of explanatory variables. Also, lagged time periods are used 
since the leverage is not carried out immediately. 
The equation is based on the assumption that supply and demand factors are the two main 
determinants of the desired level of leverage. In the absence of supply frictions, only demand factors 
like firm size explain differences in the firms’ leverage ratios. However, supply frictions as bonds and 
stocks illiquidity may affect firm decisions to issue debt.  
Leverage iτ = a  + b1 Bonds Illiquidity iτ +b2 Stocks Illiquidity iτ + bi Control variables +ε iτ 
2.1 Dependent variable measure 
 
The definition of the dependent variable, the firm leverage, is dependent on the objective of 
analysis. For example, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) point out, the relevant measure of leverage 
according to agency problems of debt (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1997)) is the debt to 
firm value because the theory relates to the firm past financing. 
Also, defining leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets is widely used and it 
provides a reasonable indication of firm’s value in case of liquidation. However, this measure does 
not indicate firm’s probability of default in the nearby future. Also, it may overstate the amount of 
leverage since it includes items that are not used for financing purposes. Therefore, defining leverage 
as the ratio of long debt to total assets might mitigate the issue of overstating leverage and give a 
good indication of the likelihood of default.  
In addition, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that a more appropriate definition of leverage is 
by the ratio of total debt to total assets. However, this measure contains measurement error since it 
includes assets that are counterbalance by specific non-debt items. Also, a suitable measure of 
leverage is the ratio of total debt to capital because it includes the effects of past financing decisions.  
We also add two measures of leverage, which is the debt issuance and the net issuance, 
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which is the difference between debt issuance and debt reduction.  
As we can infer, each ratio contains measurement error. However, the biasedness is 
mitigated by the using of all of theses leverage ratio measures.  
2.2 Bonds liquidity measures 
 
We construct many proxies for bonds liquidity using TRACE data. The first 3 measures are 
defined similar to Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012).  
The Amihud illiquidity ratio is computed using high-frequency transaction data from 
TRACE, and is defined as the daily average of absolute returns divided by the trade size in millions 
of consecutive transactions, as ∑
|Pj−Pj−1|
Pj−1
Qj
Nt
J=1 .  
Also, Roll (1984) suggests that the effective bid-ask spread can be measured using return 
autocovariance. It is computed in this paper over a 21-day rolling interval (ending on day t) within 
fiscal year as 2√−cov (ΔPt − ΔPt+1). The daily auto covariance is more likely to be positive for 
heavily traded stocks, so when we encounter a positive autocovariance, we make it zero. It is applied 
to daily data based on the assumption that the daily closing price is likely to be similar for bids and 
asks prices.  
In addition, a proxy for roundtrip costs is the bid-ask spread, which is not available in 
TRACE before November 2008. An alternative measure of transaction costs, proposed by 
Feldhutter (2010), is calculated using unique roundtrip trades (URT). The spread is defined as 
P Max−P Min
P Max
. A daily estimate is the average of roundtrip costs on that day for different volumes, and 
then we average them to get the yearly measure. 
Similar to Roll (1984), Boa, pan and Wang (2011) develop illiquidity measure, 𝛾, defined as 
the negative of the autocovariance of the returns as −cov (ΔPt − ΔPt+1). 
2.3 Control variables 
 
A number of control variables, which have been identified by previous papers are employed 
as potential explanatory factors affecting capital structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995), after surveying 
literatures on factors driving leverage, end up with four main determinants, which are specifically, 
tangibility of assets, market-to-book ratio as a proxy for investment opportunities, firm size, and 
profitability. They conclude that these factors consistently appear correlated with leverage in 
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previous studies.  
Therefore, following Rajan and Zingales (1995), our main explanatory variables are size, 
tangibility, Tobin’s Q, and profitability.  
 The first control variable is the size defined as the logarithm of sales. The relation between 
leverage and size is ambiguous.  If the size is viewed as an inverse proxy for the probability of 
bankruptcy, this can have a positive effect on the supply of debt. However, size might increase the 
outside investors’ preferences for equity relative to debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham et al 
(1998), Hovakimain et al (2001), and Bharath et al (2009) find that leverage is positively correlated 
with size. An increase in size would decrease risk, increase diversification, and lower the probability 
of distress and its expected costs. Bigger size firms may also have lower issuance costs due to the 
economies of scale. In fact, Titman and Wessels (1988) observe that small firms use comparatively 
little debt and cite this as evidence that transaction costs decrease debt issuance among small firms. 
The second control variable is tangibility, defined as property, plant, and equipment to 
assets. An increase in tangible assets would lower the cost of financial distress since a higher 
proportion of tangible assets retain more value in liquidation and serve as collateral; and it also 
decreases the agency costs of debt like assets shifting.  Therefore, tangibility increases lenders 
willingness to provide loans, and consequently leverage should be higher. Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Faulkender and Petersen (2005), and Bharath et al (2009) find a positive significant relation between 
leverage and tangibility.   
The third control variable is Tobin’s Q used as a proxy for growth opportunities, and defines 
as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, as suggested by Myers (1977). Myers 
(1977) argues that firms with high future growth expectations should use a greater amount of equity 
financing. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Faulkender and Petersen (2005), and Bharath et al (2009) find 
a negative significant relation between leverage and Tobin’s Q.   
The forth control variable is profitability, measured as the ratio of net profit to revenue. 
There are contradictory theoretical suggestions on the effects of profitability on leverage. The 
pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests a negative relation since firms prefer 
internal financing to resorting to the external market. Also, firms might use their profitability to 
decrease debt, and thus have lower leverage. However, Jensen (1986) suggests that debt is used as an 
effective corporate control mechanism to force firms to pay out free cash flow. Also, suppliers of 
debt are more willing to lend firms with high profitability. In fact, Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Faulkender and Petersen (2005), and Bharath et al (2009) find more profitable firms have lower 
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leverage. 
Therefore, the final model is:  
Equation (1): Leverage iτ = a  + b1 bonds illiquidity iτ +b2 stocks illiquidity iτ + b3 Tangibility iτ + b4 
Tobin’s q iτ +b4 size iτ +b5 Profitability iτ +ε iτ 
Table 1 Descriptive Analysis 
Panel A presents the means, medians, and standard deviations for each variable included in the study. We take the log of 
Amihud measure plus one to avoid outliers. Roll (1984) defined as the square root of negative autocovariance computed 
over a 21-day rolling interval within fiscal year. Boa, pan and Wang (2011) defined as the negative of the autocovariance 
of the returns. Relative spread is max-min spread relative to an estimate of max price. Tobin’s q is computed as the sum 
of market value of equity and book value of debt (total market value) divided by total assets. Leverage is defined as long-
term debt divided by total assets. Profit is defined as net earning scaled by the beginning revenue. Panel B shows the 
pairwise Pearson's correlation between variables included in the study. For each correlation coefficient, the table reports 
the level of the statistical significance. The superscripts a, b, and c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median S.D Variable Mean Median S.D 
Bonds illiquidity          Stocks illiquidity 
Amihud .0003 a .0022  .0143 Amihud 0.0125 0.0002 0.81 
Roll .0121 a .0056 .0699 Roll .0095 .0074 .0084 
BPW .0073 b    0    .2669 BPW .00006 .00001 .0011 
Relative spread .0083 a  .0060 .0078 Relative spread .0224  .0193  .0117 
 Control variables   Control variables    
Size  8.869 8.847 1.47 Tobin’s q 1.083 .8492 .9359 
Leverage .2316 .212 .1517 Tangibility .5631 .4592 .5173 
FCF .2229 .189 .1946 Net profit .054 .0489 .0682 
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Table continued  
Panel B: Whole Sample 
Variable Amihud Roll BPW 
Relative 
spread 
Amihud 
stocks 
Roll 
stocks 
BPW 
stocks 
Relative 
spread 
stocks 
Size Leverage 
Net 
profit 
Tobin’s q Tang. 
Amihud 1             
Roll .028 a 1            
BPW .26 a .557 a 1           
Relative 
spread 
-.0003a .005 -.005 1          
Amihud 
stocks 
.0049 .001 -.001 .0003 1         
Roll stocks .007 .037 
a
 -.0005 .016 b .0965 a 1        
BPW stocks -.000 .005 -.0003 .0017 .0112 .6610 a 1       
Relative 
spread stocks 
.0094 .092 a .017 b .023
a
 .0476 a .396 a .026 a 1      
Size -.031 a -.066 a -.029 a -.0108 -.0261 a -.1195 a -.0085 -.3383 1     
Leverage -.018 b .0015 .001 -.0072 .0077 .0417a -.002 .1907 a -.2595 a 1    
Net profit .0085 -.0085 .0015 -.0014 -.0340 a -.089 a .0194 a -.3198 .2709 a -.1080 a 1   
Tobin’s q .0254 a -.0020 -.0012 -.0076 -.0056 -.055 a -.010 -.1236 a -.1026a -.0206 b .5363 a 1  
Tangibility -.0059 .0202 b .0073 .0813 a -.0053 .0252 a -.0059 .1662 a -.0056 .1779 a -.1126 a -.1316 a 1 
 
Panel A presents summary statistics associated with illiquidity measures for stocks and bonds 
markets and other control variables. It shows the means, medians, standard deviations for each 
variable included in the study. There are no substantial differences between the whole sample and a 
subsample restricted to investment-bond firms. The medians are similar to the means suggesting 
little skewness in liquidity distribution. As expected, it seems that volatility of illiquidity measured by 
standard deviation is higher in the stocks market than the bonds market. Comparing the bonds 
illiquidity measures and stocks illiquidity measures shows inconsistency in terms of which market 
exhibit the highest illiquidity. The reason for that as we mentioned above is that these measures 
exhibit inconsistency among them and do not capture all illiquidity aspects. The inconsistency 
between illiquidity measures is apparent in the correlation results between them on panel B. 
However, most of illiquidity measures show that bonds market is more liquid. The relative decrease 
of bond illiquidity comparing to stocks illiquidity is because adverse selection is not a major concern 
in bond markets and is more important in individual stocks due to idiosyncratic shocks, as Chordia 
et al (2003) point out.  
Panel B presents summary statistics for correlations between variables included in the study. 
The most important result is the apparent low correlation between the two markets illiquidity. 
Chordia et al (2003) find that there is a little correlation in liquidity between the two markets. Also, 
Campbell and Ammer (1993) find that the unconditional correlation between stock and bonds 
returns is low. They argue that stocks and bonds covariance should be low since the only common 
factor is interest rate, which has low variability. Moreover, as suggested by Borensztein and Gelos 
(2003) individual investors’ herding behavior that typically causes higher correlations in stocks 
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market is unlikely to be a factor in bond market due to the high concentration of institutional 
investors who are less susceptible to herding behavior. 
However, many papers indicate that there are common factors that drive both markets 
causing a covariance between the two markets. Innovations and trading activity might cause an 
interaction between stocks and bonds market liquidity and a shift in portfolios between the two 
markets. A negative information shock in stocks might cause investors to substitute safe assets for 
risky one or to substitute illiquid assets for more liquid one. Fleming et al (1998) show that volatility 
affects both markets, which can affect liquidity in both markets. Also, Chordia et al (2003) find that 
innovation in one market increases the spreads in both markets. However, the innovation is not 
necessary affecting both markets equally or on the same magnitude. Chordia et al (2003) find that 
monetary easing has only a significant positive effect on stocks liquidity during crisis periods.  
Beber et al. (2009) observe that illiquidity differs based on the bonds maturities and find a 
stronger correlation between illiquidity of stocks and short-term bonds. Similarly, Goyenko and 
Ukhov (2009) find a liquidity connection between stocks and treasury bonds returns that is more 
pronounced for short-term maturities. 
David and Veronesi (2013) and Campbell et al (2013) show that covariance of stocks and 
treasuries bonds returns turned from being positive before 2000 to being negative after that. They 
offer an explanation for the changing sign, which is the role of inflation especially during recessions. 
High expected inflation causes a positive covariance between stocks and bonds and vice versa. 
During the financial crisis, bonds market provided insurance against severe adverse economic 
conditions. In addition, Connolly et al (2005) find that the covariance negativity increases in a period 
of high stocks volatility and argue that the explanation is the investors seeking safety in bonds 
market. Also, Campbell et al (2014) offer another explanation to the time variation in the covariance, 
which is the response to monetary policy changes and the change in risk aversion, particularly in bad 
times.  
However, papers trying to explain the relation between bonds and stocks illiquidity using 
firms’ level data are scarce. Nieto and Rodriguez (2015) try to narrow this gap by employing bond 
transaction prices from TRACE and find that the correlations between individual bonds and stocks 
returns are small and time variant. They also find that the correlation is negative with systematic firm 
risk, and positive with idiosyncratic risk.  
We try to investigate the causality between the two markets illiquidity for all measures. The 
Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald tests in Table 2 mostly indicate inconsistent results. Amihud’s 
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(2002) bonds illiquidity measure strongly negative Granger causes stocks illiquidity. However, using 
the spread measure, the causality is reversed. The stocks illiquidity measured by relative spread 
strongly positively Granger causes bonds illiquidity. Also, there is no bidirectional causality between 
the two markets using Roll or BPW. Interestingly, when we investigate the causality between the two 
markets illiquidity during the financial crisis. The Amihud’s (2002) bonds illiquidity measure strongly 
positively Granger causes stocks illiquidity. And the stocks illiquidity measured by relative spread 
strongly negatively Granger causes bonds illiquidity. Therefore, the signs are flipped.  
Table 2 Panel vector autoregresssion 
Table states the expected sign for each independent variable. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering.  
 
Regressor Dependent Variable in VAR 
 Amihud S. Amihud 
Amihud .0624 a -.0650 a 
S. Amihud  -.0081 1.213 a 
  
 Roll S. Roll 
Roll .1831 .0011 
S. Roll .9767 .6757 
  
 Spread bonds Spread stocks 
Spread bonds   .0738 c   .000 
Spread stocks   27.91 a   .977 a 
  
 BPW bonds BPW stocks 
BPW bonds .0453 .0000 
BPW stocks 12.82 .3576 
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3. Main Findings 
 
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the results from the regressions analyses. 
We begin with the results from the fixed effect panel models. Later, we show the findings for the 
role of financial constraints on the leverage and liquidity relation. 
As previously outlined, we estimate Equation (1) on an annual basis where we include firms’ 
dummies to capture the heterogeneity across firms and to ameliorate the endogeneity issue. Also, 
based on the main hypothesis, the bonds illiquidity coefficient should be negative and significant, 
indicating that an increase in bonds illiquidity would cause a decrease in leverage by the firm. Also, 
the stocks illiquidity coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that an increase in stocks 
illiquidity would cause an increase in leverage by the firm.  
All tables show the results of coefficients, R-squares, number of observations, and expected 
sign for each variable. For each table, we report the results of 5 models where we include different 
bonds illiquidity measures. To individually test the null hypothesis that the independent variable 
coefficients are equal zero, we report the subscripts a, b, c referring to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels, respectively. We use Huber-White corrected standard errors when computing the 
p-values to account for the possible presence of heteroskedasticity. The results are the same when 
we use robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering.  
In Table 3, where the dependent variable is leverage proxied by 6 measures, it appears that 
there is a significant negative relation between leverage measures and bonds illiquidity measures in 
the prior year. It shows statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level or higher. Thus, more 
bonds illiquid firms choose a lower level of leverage. Also, the economic magnitude of bonds 
illiquidity effect is meaningful. The consistency among the different measures of bonds illiquidity is 
apparent except for relative spread, which shows a higher magnitude.  Also, the results show that 
there is a significant positive relation between leverage measures and stocks illiquidity measure in the 
prior year. It shows statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level or higher. Thus, firms with 
high stocks illiquidity choose a higher level of leverage. Also, the economic magnitude of stocks 
illiquidity effect is meaningful since it is higher than the bonds illiquidity effect. In fact, it seems that 
the stocks illiquidity effect is the highest among all explanatory variables.  
The results of control variables are consistent with prior studies. Leverage is positively 
related to size at 1% level, except for leverage measured by debt issuance and net issuance where it 
shows less significant results. The positive relation between leverage and size is consistent with the 
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assumption that an increase in size would decrease risk, increase diversification, and lower the 
probability of distress and its expected costs. Also, leverage is positively related to tangibility at 1% 
level. It has similar significance and magnitude as the size.  The positive relation is expected since 
tangible assets would work as a collateral to lower the cost of financial distress, and would decrease 
the agency costs of debt like assets shifting.  Profitability is significant and has a negative effect on all 
measures of leverage at 1%. It has the highest magnitude among independent variables after stocks 
illiquidity variable. This correlation is consistent with the pecking order theory suggestion that the 
relation between profit and leverage should be negative since firms prefer internal financing to debt. 
Also, firms might use their earnings to pay off debt, and thus have lower leverage.  
On the other hand, Tobin’s Q shows significant positive relation with all leverage measures 
except for leverage measured by debt to market which exhibits a negative relation. Myers (1977) 
argues that firms expecting high future growth should use a greater amount of equity financing and 
thus has less leverage. In addition, the negative relation is a result of high-growth firms attempts to 
time the market via equity issuance, consistent with timing market theory suggestion by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). However, Chen and Zhao (2006) show that firms with high market-to-book ratios 
raise more debt as a result of their high profitability and low borrowing costs. They show that 
Tobin’s Q for the majority of firms is significant and positively related to the leverage ratio. In fact, 
the positive relation is consistent with our sample, which is based on investment firms where the 
agency cost is less sever due to the high concentration of institutional investors, profitability is high 
and borrowing costs is low comparing to below-grade firms. So, we should observe a positive 
relation between leverage and market-to-book ratio within this sample.  
Table 3 Fixed panel Regressions of Leverage 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Leverage= 𝛼 + 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity+ 𝛽 stocks illiquidity + 𝛽 
Tangibility+ 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀. The table states the expected sign for each independent variable. 
Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. The subscripts a, b, c 
refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for 
firm-level clustering. 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Total liability to total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative Spread BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0302 a -.0330 a -.7142 a -.0104  
Stocks illiquidity + .7126 a .7159 a .4760 a   .6322 a 
Size  + .0399 a .0398 a .0384 a .0425 a 
Tangibility + .0608 a .0607 a .0613 a .0736 a 
Profitability - -.2566 a -.2569 a -.2565 a -.2874 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ .0205 b .0209 b   .01942 b   .0134 c 
R2  0.0549 0.0558 0.0578 0.0709   
OBS  4,128 4,128 4,128 3,695 
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Table Continued 
Dependent Variable: long debt to total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0527 a -.0241 b -.6349 a .0042 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .1000 c  .0055 c -.5538 b -.7518a 
Size  + .0413 a .0405 a   .0422 a .0429a 
Tangibility + .0576 a .0569 a .0576 a .0568a 
Profitability - -.2644 a -.3053 a -.3061 a -.2792a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ .0136 b   .01454 c .01475 b .0060 
R2  0.0711 0.0853   0.0898 0.0792 
OBS  3,663 4,112 4,110   4,092 
Dependent Variable: long debt to market value 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.1527 a -.0437  -1.437  -.0165 a 
Stocks illiquidity + 2.142 b   5.417 a   3.995  5.249 a 
Size  + .0961 a .0912 a .0914 a .0905 a 
Tangibility + .0780   .0751   .0510 .0734 
Profitability - -1.720 b -1.513 c   -1.237 c -1.514 c 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -.1347 a -.1324 a -.1435 a -.1319 a 
R2  0.1326 0.2172   0.1920 0.2144 
OBS  4,141 3,672 3,245 3,640 
Dependent Variable: Total liability to Capital 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0319 a -.0377 a -.6574 b -.0153 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .9970 c .9916 c 1.064 c   .9940 c 
Size  + .0452 a .0450 a .0435 a .0452 a 
Tangibility + .0703 a   .0700 a .0703 a .0699 a 
Profitability - -.2618 a -.2621 a -.2615 a -.2623 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ .0203 b .0208 b .0194 b .0205 b 
R2  0.0628 0.0640 0.0652 0.0631   
OBS      3,785   3,785 3,785 3,773 
Dependent Variable: Debt issuance 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0978 a -.0239 c -1.031 b -.0123 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .0081 c .0081 c .0076 c   .0075 c 
Size  + .0144 b .0144 b .0126 c .0132 c 
Tangibility +   .0393    .0394 .0406 c .0384 
Profitability - -.1507 a -.1512 a -.1482 a -.1525 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ .0360 a .0360 a .0338 a .0391 a 
Leverage  - -.1536 b -.1544 a -.1625 b -.1427 b 
R2  0.0421   0.0419 0.0455   0.0452   
OBS  4,127 4,127 4,127 4,093 
Dependent Variable: Net Issuance 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0116 a -.0175 b -.3471 c -.0029 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .0036 c   .0047 b .0050 c .0045 b 
Size  + .0010 .0081 c .0074 c .0078 c 
Tangibility + .0213 b .0233 b   .0241 b .0223 b 
Profitability - -.2046 b -.0173  -.0200 -.0200 
Tobin’s Q -/+ .0356 a .0254 a .0242 a .0252 a 
Leverage  - -.1842 a -.1988 a -.1979 a -.2044 a 
R2  0.1337 0.0815   0.0821 0.0823   
OBS    3,966   3,874 3,874    3,842 
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When dealing with bonds market, the firms can be classified into high-investment-grade firms, 
and below-investment-grade firms. Several papers indicate a different behavior of liquidity between 
the two grades firms. Dick-Nielsen et al (2012) show that illiquidity increased during the subprime 
crisis and is more pronounced and less persistent for below-investment-grade bonds. In addition, 
Bessembinder et al. (2016) suggest that below-investment-grade bonds are more dependence on 
market liquidity as a result of their high exposure to asymmetric information. Kisgen and Strahan 
(2010) and Bessembinder et al. (2016) point out that institutional investors and insurance companies 
are usually required to only invest into investment-grade firms. Also, Chen et al. (2007) find that 
bonds illiquidity has a significant positive increase on yield spreads and is more pronounced for junk 
bonds.  
 In addition, the effect of illiquidity on leverage is different across bonds grades. Lemmon 
and Roberts (2010) show that a shock to stocks liquidity has a significant impact on the financing 
and investment behavior of below-investment-grade firms. Below-investment-grade firms decrease 
their total net security issuances without substitution to alternative sources of financing such as 
equity or internal funds. Faulkender and Petersen (2005) show that a supply shift by having an 
access to bond market as measured by having a debt rating, have significantly increases leverage. 
Namin (2017) also show that there is an increase in liquidity around rating upgrades announcements 
and that high credit rating firms have relatively higher bonds liquidity, excluding the financial crisis 
period, and consequently have higher leverage.  
Therefore, we repeat our initial analysis for the whole sample by including the below-
investment-grade firms. The results show consistent results for the main variables with no material 
difference, that firms with high bonds illiquidity choose a lower level of leverage, and firms with 
high stocks illiquidity choose a higher level of leverage.  
 Interestingly, Tobin’s Q shows significant negative relation with all leverage measures, in 
contrast to our initial results. This result is consistent with Myers (1977) argument that firms 
expecting high future growth should use a greater amount of equity finance and thus has less 
leverage, and is consistent with the argument of Baker and Wurgler (2002) that many high-growth 
firms actively time the market by equity issuance.  
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Table 4 Fixed panel Regressions of Leverage – Whole sample 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Leverage= 𝛼 + 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity+ 𝛽 stocks illiquidity + 𝛽 
Tangibility+ 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀.The table states the expected sign for each independent variable. 
Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. The subscripts a, b, c 
refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for 
firm-level clustering. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Total liability to total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0120 c -.0299 a -.1858 a -.0025 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .0015 a .0015 a    2.338 a .0015 a 
Size  + .0205 b   .0201 b .0268 a   .0204 b 
Tangibility + .0284 .0285 .0061  .0290 
Profitability - -.0924 c -.0934 c -.1011 a -.0923 c 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -.0159 b -.0162 b .0059  -.0159 b 
Rating up  -.0124 -.0121   -.0069 -.0123  
R2  0.0175 0.0188 0.0400 0.0179 
OBS  6,365 6,988 5,302 6,341 
Dependent Variable: long debt to total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0318 a -.0121 -.3846 b -.0013 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .0011 b .0011 b .0012 b .0012 b 
Size  + .0174 b .0171 b .0160 c .0173 b 
Tangibility + .0282 b .0283 c   .0312 b .0289 c 
Profitability - -.1433 a -.1432 a -.1516 a -.1515 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -.0088 -.0089 .0026 .0031 
Rating Up  -.0232 b -.0231b -.0258 b -.0243 b 
R2  0.0300   0.0302 0.0320 0.0287 
OBS  6,365 6,365 6,356 6,334 
Dependent Variable: Debt to market value 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.5249 a -.4166 c -.7089 -.0158 
Stocks illiquidity +   9.788 b 10.11 b   8.094 c 9.616 b 
Size  + .2163 b .2111 b .2305 c .2201 b 
Tangibility + -.0801 -.0758 -.0322 -.0833 
Profitability - -1.236 b -1.226 c -1.306 c -1.251 c 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -.2683 b -.2702 b -.3173 b -.2670 b 
Rating Up  -.0030 .0015 .0078 .0033 
R2  0.0071   0.0074 0.0060 0.0069 
OBS  7,588 7,588 6,360 7,474 
Dependent Variable: Total liability to Capital 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.2250 b -.0368 a -.2408 a -.0171 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .0016 a .0013 a .0013 a .0013 a 
Size  + .0330 a .0322 a .0316 a .0329 a 
Tangibility + .0368 c .0376 c .0382 c   .0356 c 
Profitability - -.1065 b -.1079 b -.1118 b -.1031 b 
Tobin’s Q -/+   .0047 .0044 .0039 -.0004 
Rating Up  -.0111 -.0107 -.0120 -.0104 
R2  .0148 .0163 .0158 0.0149 
OBS  5,100 5,100 5,100   5,088 
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Next, we redefine the main independent variable by making a ratio of bonds illiquidity to 
stock illiquidity. Since our main concern is to test the relative importance of illiquidity, we expect 
that an increase in bonds illiquidity relative to stock illiquidity would decrease the leverage.   
In table 5, the ratio coefficient is negative and highly significant for the investment sample 
and for the whole sample. It shows negative correlation between the ratio and leverage measures, 
indicating that an increase in the ratio would decrease bonds financing.  
The reported results are based on defining illiquidity based on Roll measure. However, when 
we define illiquidity based on other measures the results are similar in magnitude and significance.    
Table 5 Fixed panel Regressions of Leverage-Relative illiquidity  
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Leverage= 𝛼 + 𝛽 Log (Bonds illiquidity/ stocks illiquidity) + 𝛽 
Tangibility+ 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀. The table states the expected sign for each independent variable. 
Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. The subscripts a, b, c 
refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for 
firm-level clustering. 
 
Table Continued 
Dependent Variable: Debt issuance 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0032 a .0108 -.0337 .0008 
Stocks illiquidity + .0024 a .0024 a .0024 a .0024 a 
Size  + -.0049 -.0047 -.0051 -.0045 
Tangibility + .0416 a .0416 a .0418 a .0415 a 
Profitability - -.2322 b -.2322 b -.2322 a -.2328 b 
Tobin’s Q -/+ .0320 a .0320 a .0319 a   .0321 a 
Leverage  - -.1129 a -.1129 a -.1127 a -.1133 a 
Rating  -.0092   -.0094 -.0093 -.0093 
R2  .0419 .0420 0.0419 0.0422 
OBS  6,351 6,351 6,351 6,329 
Dependent Variable: Net Issuance 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0029 -.0215 -.4383 a -.0042 a 
Stocks illiquidity + .0007 a .0007 a .0007 a .0007 a 
Size  + -.0117 a -.0123 a -.0136 a -.0118 b 
Tangibility + .0296 c .0298c .0326 c .0301 c 
Profitability - -.0969 -.0969 -.0973 -.0975 
Tobin’s Q -/+ .0309 a .0306 a .0296 a .0306 a 
Leverage  - -.1504 a -.1503a -.1479 a -.1493 a 
Rating  .0002 .0005 -.0005 .0005 
OBS  6,159 6,159 6,159 6,138 
R2  0.0639 0.0651 0.0692 0.0660 
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Whole sample  
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
Log (ratio) - -0.0130 a -0.0140 a -0.0130 a -0.0678 a 
Size  + -0.0034 0.0023 0.0010 0.0965 b 
Tangibility + 0.0022 0.0114 -0.0039 -0.1150 
Profitability - -0.1059 c -0.1046 b -0.1391 b -0.9255 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -0.0080 c -0.0065  -0.0113 b -0.3865 a 
R2  0.0611 0.0288 0.0698 0.0997 
OBS  7,815 8,712 8,087 7,953 
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We also create a dummy that takes 1 if the ratio is above 1 and zero otherwise. A ratio that is 
more than 1 indicates an increase in bonds illiquidity relative to stock illiquidity, which will make 
bonds issuance more costly, and consequently decease the leverage. On the other hand, a ratio that 
is less than 1 indicates an increase in stocks illiquidity relative to bonds illiquidity, which will make 
stocks issuance more costly, and consequently increase the leverage.   
In table 6, the independent variable defined as 1 when the ratio of bonds illiquidity to stock 
illiquidity is above 1 is negative and highly significant, indicating that an increase in bonds illiquidity 
relative to stock illiquidity deceases the leverage. On the other hand, a ratio that is less than 1 
indicating that an increase in stocks illiquidity relative to bonds illiquidity is significantly positive.   
Table 6 Fixed panel Regressions of Leverage- Relative illiquidity 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Leverage= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ratio above 1 + 𝛽 Tangibility+ 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s 
q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀. The table states the expected sign for each independent variable. Full definitions of the variables 
appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% 
statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results assessed with (heteroskedasticity) robust standard errors corrected 
for firm-level clustering. 
 
 
 
 
Table Continued  
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Investment bonds  
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability 
to total assets 
Debt to 
market value 
Log (ratio) - -0.0163 a -0.0170 a -0.0146 a -0.0913 a 
Size  + 0.0318 a 0.0348 a 0.0285 a 0.3171 a 
Tangibility + 0.0296 0.0336 c 0.0289  0.2323 b 
Profitability - -0.2861 a -0.2628 a -0.2818 a -0.9768 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0146 b 0.0033 0.0141 b -0.4203 a 
R2  0.0954 0.1135 0.0833 0.1855 
OBS  3,524 4,242 3,957 3,947 
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Whole sample  
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0121 a -0.01830 a -0.0130 a -0.0532 b 
Size  + 0.0036 0.01093 c 0.0037 0.1004 b 
Tangibility + 0.0092 0.01344 0.0104 -0.0522 
Profitability - -0.0969 c -0.11806 a -0.1146 b -0.6589 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -0.0164 b -0.01516 b -0.0154 b -0.3776 a 
R2  0.0541 0.0331 0.0640 0.0826 
OBS  8,059 8,355 9,007 8,831 
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Investment bonds  
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0210 a -0.0242 a -0.0234 a -0.0793 b 
Size  + 0.0368 a 0.0405 a 0.0332 a 0.3853 a 
Tangibility + 0.0683 a 0.0350  0.0587 a 0.2479 b 
Profitability - -0.2730 a -0.2753 a -0.2789 a -0.9720 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0210 a 0.0169 a 0.0211 a -0.4113 a 
R2  0.0970 0.1054 0.0868 0.1603 
OBS  3,554 4,014 3,860   4,292 
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Moreover, we get the median of leverage for each industry in each period. Then, we divide 
the sample to above or below the industry median and create an interacted dummy between firms 
who has a ratio below 1 and a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is above the industry 
median. What we want to show is that if a firm were having above the median leverage, they would 
not issue debt even though they have high stock illiquidity.  The cost of adding more leverage to a 
high leverage firm outweighs stock illiquidity cost. The results are consistent with this suggestion. 
For all leverage measures, the interacted dummy is negative and highly significant. It indicates that 
high stock illiquidity firms do not issue debt if they are above the industry median. The results also 
imply that firms respect trade off policy, that is there is an optimal leverage, and thus firms may 
ignore the lower illiquidity principle when the leverage is high. 
Table 7 Fixed panel Regressions of Leverage- Below ratio interacted with Median of leverage  
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Leverage= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ratio above 1 + 𝛽 ratio below 1* Leverage above 
industry median + 𝛽 Tangibility+ 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀. The table states the expected sign for each 
independent variable. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. 
The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust 
standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
 
 
We also want to control for the current status of firms leverage and to show that the effect 
of relative illiquidity is not consumed by the leverage status of the firm.  
First, running a regression with relative illiquidity, as dependent dummy variable, and over-
levered as an independent variable do not yield any significant results. 
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Whole sample  
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
Ratio below 1 + 0.0527a 0.0689 a 0.0381 a 0.1883 a 
Ratio below 1*Lev. above median - -0.0692 a -0.1018 a -0.0478 a -0.2647 a 
Size  + 0.0009 0.0053 0.0037 0.0991 c 
Tangibility + 0.0979 a 0.0624 a 0.1002 a -0.0594 
Profitability - -0.4610 a -0.1855 a -.4542 a -0.6339 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -0.0011 -0.0056 -0.0218  -0.3688 a 
R2  0.2286 0.1421   0.2224 0.2760 
OBS  8,059 9,005 9,020 8,831 
Dependent Variable: Leverage- Investment bonds  
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
Ratio below 1 + 0.0634 a 0.0717 a 0.0490 a 0.2138 a 
Ratio below 1* Lev. above industry  - -0.0656 a -0.0787 a -0.0440 a -0.2037 a 
Size  + 0.0305 a 0.0331 a 0.0272 a 0.3763 a 
Tangibility + 0.0601 a 0.0502 a 0.0455 a 0.2286 b 
Profitability - -0.3199 a -0.2718 a 0.3445 a -0.9055 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0219 a 0.0077 0.0126 a -0.4030 a 
R2  0.1929 0.2396    0.1431   0.1698 
OBS  3,877 4,315   4,315 4,292 
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Second, running another regression using leverage as a dependent continuous variable and 
both relative illiquidity and current leverage status as independent variables still yield significant 
results for our main variable. In fact, for all leverage measures, the relative illiquidity has a high 
negative coefficient and high p-value at 1%. The current leverage status is negative and 
significant. The results are not affected by restricting the sample to just high quality firms or the 
inclusion of the financial crisis.  
Table 8 Fixed panel Regressions of Leverage - Median of leverage 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Leverage= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ratio above 1 + Leverage above industry median + 
𝛽 Tangibility+ 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀. The table states the expected sign for each independent 
variable. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. The 
subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard 
errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
 
 
In Table 9, we add to the base equation the financial constraint dummy interacted with the 
bonds illiquidity variable to capture the effect of financial constraints. We use firm size and Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997)’s index. On an annual basis, we rank firms by the financial constraints into four 
quartiles. Then, we create a dummy variable that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top quartile 
and zero otherwise.  
The results of regressions show that more financially constrained firms have a more 
pronounced effect of bonds illiquidity. 
Specifically, the results from the inclusion of the variable that represents the interaction 
between bonds illiquidity and a dummy for small firms are negative and statistically significant across 
all models. The significant negativity shows that small firms are more vulnerable to capital market 
 Dependent Variable: Leverage-Whole sample 
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0127 a -0.0170 a -0.0134 a -0.0538 b 
Lev. above median - -0.0708 a -0.0744 a -0.0691 a -0.3916 a 
Size  + 0.0042 0.0085 0.0044 0.1044 b 
Tangibility + 0.0099 0.0149 0.0109 -0.0569 
Profitability - -0.0867 a -0.0865 b -0.1042 b -0.5922 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -0.0126 a -0.0080 -0.0117 c -0.3534 a 
R2  0.1663 0.2295 0.1673   0.3402 
OBS  9,105 10,483 10,485    8,831 
 Dependent Variable: Leverage- Investment bonds 
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0229 a -0.0237 a -0.0198 a -0.0760 b 
Lev. above median - -0.0495 a -0.0519 a -0.0514 a -0.2752 a 
Size  + 0.0360 a 0.0347 a 0.0302 a 0.3746 a 
Tangibility + 0.0592 a 0.0468  0.0275 a 0.2196 b 
Profitability - -0.2579 a -0.2530 a -0.2459 a -0.8467 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0243 a 0.0124 a 0.0185 a -0.3921 a 
R2  0.1602 0.1602 0.1196 0.1830 
OBS  3,860 4,304 4,304 4,292 
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imperfections since they are less known and have less access to external market.  
Similarly, the results from Kaplan and Zingales (1997)’s index interacted with bonds 
illiquidity are negative and significant across all models, indicating a higher sensitivity form the 
financially constrained firms to the effect of illiquidity, similar to the leverage effect.  
These results are indicators of the robustness of our findings, which suggest that the effect 
of bonds illiquidity on leverage is more prominent in the more financially constrained firms. 
Table 9 Fixed panel Regressions: Financial constraints 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: leverage= 𝛼 + 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity+ 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity* Financial 
constraint + 𝛽 stocks illiquidity + 𝛽 Tangibility+ 𝛽 size + 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀.The table states the expected 
sign for each independent variable. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in 
Table 1 Panel A. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results 
are robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  long debt to market value-Small size 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0938 -.0145 -1.101 c 
Bonds illiquidity * size - -.7394 a -.0452 b -4.867 a 
Stocks illiquidity  + 3.235 b 3.201 b 3.240 a 
Size  + .0907 a   .0881 a .0797 a 
Tangibility + .1165 b .1150 b .1186 a 
Profitability - -.8661 a   -.8656 a -.8394 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -.0432 a -.0438 a -.0374 a 
R2  0.0807 0.0784 0.13 
OBS   4,545 4,545 4,069 
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Whole sample 
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0147 a -0.0144 a -0.0139 a 
Ratio above 1*size - -0.0192 a -0.0187 a -0.0189 a 
Lev. above median - -0.0867 a -0.1400 a -0.0853 a 
Size  + 0.0011 0.0056  0.0010 
Tangibility + 0.0949 a 0.0573 a 0.0963 a 
Profitability - -0.4522 a -0.1699 a -0.4463 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0001 -0.0033 0.0004 
R2  0.2718 0.2547 0.2655 
OBS  8,059 9,005 9,007 
Dependent Variable: Leverage- Investment bonds 
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0161 a -0.0162 a -0.0180 a 
Ratio above 1* size  - -0.0154 a -0.0180 a -0.0166 a 
Lev. above median - -0.0543 a -0.0974 a -0.0753 a 
Size  + 0.0294 a 0.0288 a 0.0197 b 
Tangibility + 0.0519 a 0.0354 a 0.0381 a 
Profitability - -0.3520 a -0.2445 a -0.2969 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0256 a 0.0092 b 0.0225 
R2  0.1889 0.3560 0.2329 
OBS  3,877  4,315   4,315 
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Table Continued 
Dependent Variable:  long debt to market value- Index 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.2108 a -.0305 b -1.250 
Bonds illiquidity * Index - -2.609 a -1.914 b -3.267 b 
Stocks illiquidity  + 4.960 a 4.339 a 4.134 a 
Size  + .0824 a .0805 a .0773 a 
Tangibility + .1212 a .0915 b .0891 b 
Profitability - -.8542 a -.8018 a -.7823 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -.0415 a -.0486 a -.0482 a 
R2  0.1156 0.0850 0.0852 
OBS  4,069 3,182 3,182 
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Whole sample 
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0109 a -0.0154 a -0.0115 a 
Ratio above 1* Index - -0.0105 c -0.0103 b -0.0088 
Lev. above median - -0.0871 a -0.1402 a -0.0855 a 
Size  + 0.0014 0.0050 0.0012 
Tangibility + 0.0958 a 0.0577 a 0.0971 a 
Profitability - -0.4541 a -0.1713 a -0.4477 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0002 -0.0034 0.0003 
R2  0.2685   0.2524 0.2624 
OBS  8,059 9,005 9,007 
Dependent Variable: Leverage- Investment bonds 
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Ratio above 1 - -0.0164 a -0.0182 a -0.0164 a 
Ratio above 1* Index - -0.0221 a -0.0205 a -0.0221 a 
Lev. above median - -0.0752 a -0.0972 a -0.0752 a 
Size  + 0.0197 b 0.0281 a 0.0197 b 
Tangibility + 0.0371 a 0.0342 a 0.0371 a 
Profitability - -0.3044 a -0.2508 a -0.3044 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0229 a 0.0095 b 0.0229 a 
R2  0.2263 0.3507 0.2263 
OBS  4,315 4,315 4,315 
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4. Robustness  
 
We do not confine our results to a specific measure of leverage or illiquidity and show that our 
results are robust for all measures. Also, we address the issue of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation by using Huber-White corrected standard errors when computing the p-values and 
got robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
In this section, we also address different issues, specifically, endogeneity, stability over time, and 
the difference between investment and junk bonds in terms of liquidity.  
4.1 Endogeneity  
 
In all our models, we use fixed effect models, which as Lemmon et al. (2008) state make 
important differences in the estimated coefficients in leverage, because leverage is a level and not a 
change. Also, fixed effect models make important differences since one of the most common 
reasons for endogeneity in corporate finance is omitted variables as a result of the heterogeneity. In 
a setting aimed at understanding firm behavior, any time-invariant variable that are not observed in 
the data, such as unobservable technological differences across firms, could contribute to the 
presence of a fixed effect. Using fixed effect model in panel data can ameliorate this issue as 
suggested by Roberts and Whited (2013). We first check for statistical significance in differences 
between random and fixed effects with a standard Hausman test in which the null is random effects 
and the alternative is fixed effects, which shows that the appropriate model is the fixed effect.  
4.1.1 Heckman (1976) test for sample selection bias 
 
In addition, to address the endogeneity resulted from sample selection bias, Heckman (1976) 
introduced the Heckman model, a two-stage approach for data analysis. The results of the Heckman 
(1979) are not reported for brevity. The result show that Inverse Mills Ratio is insignificant, bonds 
illiquidity is negative with (-.0559) and significant at 5% level, and that stocks illiquidity is positive 
with (.0011) and significant at 1% level, suggesting that our findings are not affected by selection 
bias. We also get similar results when leverage is defined differently like by long debt to assets or 
liability to capital.    
4.1.2 GMM Test 
 
In addition, we estimate dynamic GMM regressions to address the endogeneity concerns. 
Particularly, we use the dynamic GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
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Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate the dynamic regression model. GMM estimator outweighs 
fixed-effects estimates because it allows current leverage to be influenced by previous realizations of 
past performance. Two lags of leverage are sufficient to capture the dynamic endogeneity.  The main 
result of the GMM estimate still shows a negative effect of bonds illiquidity on leverage  (-.0251) 
with a high significance at 1% and a positive significant effect of stocks illiquidity on leverage (.001). 
There is no substantial difference in employing different measures of leverage.    
4.1.3 Granger causality 
 
Moreover, we try to explicitly investigate the causality between the leverage and illiquidity for 
all measures using the Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test. The results mostly indicate bonds 
illiquidity significantly Granger causes leverage, while leverage does not Granger cause bonds 
illiquidity. Interestingly, there is no significant causality between stocks illiquidity measure and 
leverage except for spread relative measure. It appears that the casualty tests are sensitive to how the 
leverage or illiquidity is measured. However, casualty tests are consistent whether we include 
financial crisis period or restrict the sample to investment-grade bonds.   
Table 10 Panel vector autoregresssion- whole sample 
Table states the expected sign for each independent variable where Leverage defined as long term debt to total assets.  
The p-values of the zero mean t-test are reported in parenthesis. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% 
statistical significance levels, respectively. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the table are provided in Table 1 
Panel A.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
Regressor Dependent in VAR Regressor Dependent in VAR 
 Amihud Leverage  S.Amihud Leverage 
Amihud .0528 a -.0075 b S.Amihud .2226 .0006 
Leverage -.1139 .2730 Leverage 3.929 .2734 
    
 Roll Leverage  S.Roll Leverage 
Roll .1999 -.0139 c S.Roll .4344 a -.7928 
Leverage  .5982 .5959 a Leverage  -.0056 .3303 
    
  Spread Leverage  S.Spread Leverage 
Spread  .2004 c -.5280 c S.Spread   .709 a  - .24 c 
Leverage  .0858 .3348 Leverage  .0508 .4752 b 
    
 BPW Leverage  S.BPW Leverage 
BPW .0109 -.0017 c S.BPW -.0193 -.2065 
Leverage  3.982 .2365 Leverage  -.0088 .2733 
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4.2 Stability over time  
 
In this section, we test the stability of our main results over time since several studies document 
a change in market liquidity during the time of financial crisis. Friewald et al. (2012) and Dick-
Nielsen et al. (2012) among others find that US corporate bonds liquidity significantly plummeted 
during the financial crisis in 2008. During the financial crisis, credit quality and liquidity’s fall 
increase yield spreads, decrease investors’ portfolio values, and increase firms’ financing costs.  
Therefore, considering the results of significant liquidity deterioration for corporate bonds 
during the financial crisis in 2008, we repeat our initial analysis for the same sample excluding the 
financial crisis period (2008) as in Friewald et al. (2012).  
The results are not affected by the exclusion of financial crisis period, indicating a stability of our 
results through time, that there is a significant negative relation between leverage measures and 
bonds illiquidity measures, and that there is a significant positive relation between leverage measures 
and stocks illiquidity measure. Thus, firms with high bonds illiquidity choose a lower level of 
leverage, and firms with high stocks illiquidity choose a higher level of leverage. Also, control 
variables’ results are consistent with the main analysis and prior studies. 
In addition, we control for time effect by adding a dummy variable for each period in our 
sample and the results for bonds and stocks illiquidity are not affected.  
4.3 Difference in leverage  
To examine whether firms’ response is to differences in illiquidity or to the current leverage 
situation. In other words, examining if illiquidity is related to the leverage status. Similar to (Bharath 
et al (2009)), we run the regression: 
∆Leverage iτ = a + b1 ∆Ratio iτ + b2 ∆Tangibility iτ + b3 ∆Qratio iτ +b4 ∆Log sales iτ +b5 
∆Profitability iτ +b6 Leverageiτ−1 +ε iτ, where all variables are fiscal year-on-year changes of the level 
variables. Also, we include lagged leverage to control for the possibility of mean reversion in 
leverage in the literature. 
 The results show that a change in the extent of firm-level illiquidity has a negative significant 
effect on the changes in firms’ leverage. Also, the lagged leverage indicates a mean reversion in 
leverage. 
4.4 Exogenous shock-Financial Crisis 
The implicit assumption in the previous results is that market illiquidity is exogenously 
determined. However, if there are variables, which we do not observe, that affect our main 
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independent variables, then our coefficient could be biased. To address this potential problem, we 
use financial crisis as purely exogenous variable.  
As we mentioned, Friewald et al. (2012) and Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) among others find that 
US corporate bonds liquidity significantly plummeted during the financial crisis in 2008. During the 
financial crisis, credit quality and liquidity’s fall increase yield spreads, decrease investors’ portfolio 
values, and increase firms’ financing costs.  
Therefore, considering the results of significant liquidity deterioration for corporate bonds 
during the financial crisis in 2008, we use financial crisis period in place of bonds illiquidity.  
For all leverage measures, the financial crisis has a high negative effect and a high p- value at 
1%. The current leverage status is negative and significant. The results ate not affected by restricting 
the sample to just high quality. In fact, the effect and significance of relative illiquidity and the 
financial crisis are similar.   
Table 11 Fixed panel Regressions of Leverage- Financial Crisis 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Leverage (t+1)= 𝛼 + 𝛽 Financial crisis+ Leverage above industry 
median + 𝛽 Tangibility+ 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 Profitability + 𝜀. The table states the expected sign for each 
independent variable. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. 
The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust 
standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Leverage-Whole sample  
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
FC - -0.0192 a -0.0187 a -0.0196 a -0.0748 b 
Lev. above median - -0.0703 a -0.0739 a -0.0687 a -0.3901 a 
Size  + 0.0067  0.0120 c 0.0072 0.1166 b 
Tangibility + 0.0096 0.0154 0.0111 -0.0555 
Profitability - -0.0906 c -0.0897 b -0.1076 b -0.6057 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ -0.0142 b -0.0095 -0.0133 c -0.3601 a 
R2  0.1620 0.1893 0.1612 0.1121 
OBS  8,059 9,005 7,679 8,831 
 Dependent Variable: Leverage- Investment bonds 
Variables  Expected sign Total liability to 
Capital 
Long debt to 
total assets 
Total liability to 
total assets 
Debt to market 
value 
FC - -0.0125 a -0.0092 a -0.0140 a -0.0315  
Lev. above median - -0.0497 a -0.0530 a -0.0512 a -0.2755 a 
Size  + 0.0451 a 0.0396 a 0.0374 a 0.4020 a 
Tangibility + 0.0606 a 0.0292 0.0316 0.2354 b 
Profitability - -0.2661 a -0.2465 a -0.2491 a -0.8630 a 
Tobin’s Q -/+ 0.0234 a 0.0118 b 0.0176 a -0.3931 a 
R2  0.1242      0.1377 0.1106 0.1804   
OBS  3,554 3,861 4,304 4,292 
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5. Conclusion 
 
We hypothesize that firms would likely compare the illiquidity of two sources of external 
financing at a given point in time and issue the one with lower illiquidity. Therefore, if the level of 
illiquidity is a key driver of firms’ capital structure decisions in that year, the higher the level of 
stocks illiquidity, the more of its financing needs are satisfied by the issuance of debt, and the higher 
the level of bonds illiquidity, the less of its financing needs are satisfied by the issuance of debt.  
Even after controlling for the firm characteristics previously found to determine observed 
capital structure, we find that illiquidity of the two sources of external funding affects the capital 
structure decisions of U.S. firms over the sample period 2003-2018. Specifically, the coefficient of 
bonds illiquidity is negative, large, and strongly significant regardless of leverage measurement, and 
the coefficient of stocks illiquidity is positive, large, and strongly significant regardless of leverage 
measurement. We also show that the relative importance of external financing’s illiquidity has an 
opposing effect of firm’s leverage ratio.  An increase in bonds illiquidity relevant to stock illiquidity, 
has a negative influence on leverage since it increases stock issuance. While an increase in stocks 
illiquidity relevant to bonds illiquidity, has a positive influence on leverage since it increases bonds 
issuance. Also, both the sign and the significance of the coefficients for the conventional variables 
are consistent with previous literatures.  We also address different issues like endogeneity, stability 
over time, and the difference between investment and junk bonds in terms of liquidity, and find that 
the main results are robust and consistent.  
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Chapter Two 
Impact of Relative Liquidity of Stocks and Bonds on the Investment decisions 
1. Introduction and hypotheses development   
 
A central question in the finance literature is whether the firms respond to the market signals 
when making corporate decisions.  In this study, we investigate whether bonds and stocks illiquidity 
affect firm investment decisions employing a US data set.  
Illiquidity or trading costs are critically considered in many investment and financial 
decisions. Amihud and Mandelson (1986) define illiquidity as the cost of immediate execution since 
the offer price comprises a buying premium and the bid price includes a sale discount.   
Numerous studies have established a link between financial markets and firms decisions. For 
example, Barro (1990) states that changes in stock prices have substantial effect on US investment 
decisions, even after controlling for cash flow variables. Likewise, Fang et al. (2009) investigate the 
relation between stock liquidity and firm performance. They show a positive relation between stock 
liquidity and firm performance measured by market to book ratio.  The justifications of this positive 
relation are the increase in information content of market prices and the increase of performance-
sensitivity of managerial compensation. In addition, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that an 
improvement in stock liquidity would cause assets in place to be discounted at a lower cost of 
capital, leading to an increase in firm value.  
Recently, Cheung et al. (2016) investigate the consequences of stock liquidity on firm value 
and corporate governance and find that stocks liquidity improves firm value, as measured by Tobin's 
Q and leads to corporate governance enhancement due to the increase of institutional ownership. 
Thus, the increase of market liquidity facilitates the entry of informed shareholders and relaxes 
firm’s financial constraints.  Another reason for the positive relation between market liquidity and 
investment is the decrease of financing cost due to the increase of liquidity.  Hong and Stein (2007) 
by using disagreement models show that liquidity can be a proxy for the disagreement among 
investors generating a positive relationship between liquidity and investment.  
Another explanation of the positive relation between liquidity and firm investment is 
liquidity premium hypothesis.  Myers (1977) argues that firm value is consisted of both assets in 
place and future investment opportunities.  An increase in bonds liquidity would lower the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC), and hence expand the investment opportunity set. Since firms 
evaluate their future projects using WACC to determine the set of viable projects that are available 
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to undertake, a lower hurdle rate increases investment. Therefore, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
show that liquidity has a positive effect on growth by reducing the cost of capital used to discount 
firms’ new investments.  
  Another effect of the increase in bonds liquidity is its increase of borrowing capacity 
since it decreases the debt’s issuance cost and consequently expands firm’s investment. Butler et al 
(2005) provide evidence that there is a negative correlation between investment bank fees and stock 
liquidity. In a similar works, Lipson and Mortal (2009) investigate the correlation between stocks 
liquidity and equity issuance and find firms with high stock liquidity have lower issuance costs.  
Therefore, holding other factors constant, a firm’s future investments increase in its bonds 
and stocks liquidity. The increase in investment opportunities due to the increase in market liquidity 
is due the decrease of the firm’s cost of capital and the decrease in its issuance cost.  
Hypothesis 1a. A higher level of a firm’s bonds illiquidity would decrease firm’s investment. 
Hypothesis 1b. A higher level of a firm’s stocks illiquidity would decrease firm’s investment. 
1.1 Effect of different firm’s financial constraints 
 
Similar to illiquidity, financial constraints are an imperfection in the market. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) argue that market imperfections cause the supply of capital to be inelastic and affect 
firms’ investment policy. Bolton and Freixas (2000) suggests a model in which risky firms are 
incapable of obtaining financing because of asymmetric information between firms and external 
investors. The implication here is that there are a heterogeneity among firms in their credit rationing, 
in that less financially healthy firms are more likely to be rationed than relatively healthier firms. 
Thus, we expect a different effect of illiquidity across different firms level. Munoz (2013) finds a 
positive relationship between trading volume and investment using a panel of Latin American firms. 
He also finds that this effect is greater for firms with higher financial constraints and larger 
investment opportunities. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that a shock to stock liquidity has 
negative significant impact on the financing and investment behavior of below-investment-grade 
firms.  
Therefore, more financially constrained firms would have a high-pronounced effect of 
bonds illiquidity. The relaxation of financial constraints means that firms would have more internal 
funds or easier excess to equity market that consequently makes the bonds market and its 
imperfections irrelevant. Conversely, firms with more financially constraints will benefit more from 
bonds liquidity, as it makes it easier for them to borrow externally.  
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To capture the effect of financial constraints and to reassure that results are not driven by 
the choice of a single determinant, we use firm size, firm leverage, firm payout ratio and Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997)’s index (KZ index, hereafter), following Fazzari et al., (1988), Almedia et al., (2004), 
and Alhassan et al. (2017). We also add two other measures of financial constraints, which are stock 
illiquidity and below-investment bonds firms. On an annual basis, we rank firms by the financial 
constraints into four quartiles. Then, we create a dummy variable that takes one if the firm is 
assigned in the top quartile and zero otherwise. This dummy represents firms in the highest quartile. 
We will test the hypothesis by adding to the base specification the financial constraint dummy 
interacted with bonds illiquidity variable. A significant coefficient would show that liquidity is more 
relevant for firms with greater financial constraints.  
The first financial constraint is the firm size. Almedia et al. (2004) argue that small firms are 
more vulnerable to capital market imperfections since they are less known. Beck et al. (2008) show 
evidence that there is a difference in funding between firms based on their size, making small firms 
more inclined to financial constraints.  Therefore, small firms should be more sensitive to bond 
liquidity.  An interacted dummy between illiquidity and big firms is added to the base regression, and 
it should be significant and positive as evidence that the effect of illiquidity is smaller for large firms 
showing that they are less affected by illiquidity since they have more access to capital.  
Firm leverage ratio is another proxy for financial constraints since a high leverage ratio 
would lower firm’s debt capacity and their ability to acquire additional finance.  An interacted 
dummy between illiquidity and high leverage firms is added to the base regression, and it should be 
significant and negative, as evidence that the effect of illiquidity is greater for high leverage firms. 
Payout Ratio is another proxy for financial constraints and one of the most prevalent in the 
literature. Firm’s ability to pay dividend is an indication of its internal financing capacity. Fazzari et 
al. (1988) argue that financially constrained firms are more likely to have lower payout ratios. We 
define payout ratio as the dividends divided by income before extraordinary items.  An interacted 
dummy between illiquidity and high payout firms is added to the base regression, and it should be 
significant and positive, as evidence that the effect of illiquidity is lower for high payout firms.  
KZ index is introduced by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and has been used to proxy for 
financial constraints in many related studies (Almeida et al., 2004, Alhassan et al. (2017), and others). 
Therefore, similar to the effect of leverage ratio, the interaction variable should be negative and 
significant, indicating a higher sensitivity form the financially constrained firms to the effect of 
illiquidity.  
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In addition, we use stock illiquidity as another measure of financial constraints. An interacted 
dummy between bonds illiquidity and a dummy representing firms with high stock illiquidity is 
added to the base regression, and it should be significant and negative, as evidence that the effect of 
illiquidity is greater for those firms. 
Lastly, we use the sample of firms with junk bonds as another proxy for financial 
constraints. Dick-Nielsen et al (2011) show that bonds spread is low and persistent for investment-
grade bonds while the effect is stronger but less persistent for below-investment-grade bonds. An 
increase in the spread means an increase in the bond risk and thus less accessibility to external 
market. An interacted dummy between illiquidity and firms with junk bonds is added to the base 
regression, and it should be significant and negative, as evidence that the effect of liquidity is greater 
for these firms.   
Hypothesis 2. The effect of bonds illiquidity is higher on financially constrained firms due to 
the limited access for external capital. 
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2. Data 
 
We use annual data from 2003-2018. Our sample includes all nonfinancial firm observations 
in the Compustat database between 2003 and 2018. We end up with 1,176 firms. We employ S&P’s 
credit rating to classify firms, where firms rated BBB – or higher are investment-grade firms and 
firms rated BB+ or lower are below- investment-grade firms. 
We estimate a fixed effect panel model, following the standard approach popular in many 
previous papers. The use of panel data analysis allows us to better control for firm heterogeneity and 
reduce the issue of multicollinearity of explanatory variables. Also, lagged time periods are used 
since the investment is not carried out immediately. 
2.1. Dependent variable measure 
 
Investment opportunity set which is not observable can be proxied by capital expenditures, 
which is observable. As Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) point out, capital expenditures reflect 
managerial ability to utilize current investment opportunities.  
Also, we consider two additional alternative proxies for investment opportunities, acquisition 
expenses and book-to-market equity. Different investment measures represent different aspects of 
corporate investment decisions and allow us to achieve a more comprehensive analysis.   
The first alternative proxy for investment opportunities is acquisition expense. Field et al 
(2014) point out that firms with higher bond liquidity will be more likely to undertake acquisitions, 
as liquidity reduces cost of debt and potential acquisitions are discounted at a lower hurdle rate. 
Harford and Uysal (2013) find that firms’ access to debt markets by having a higher credit rating 
increases its likelihood of undertaking acquisitions.  
The second alternative proxy for investment opportunities is book-to-market value of equity. 
Since high book-to-market indicates a low-growth (value) stock, and low book-to-market indicates a 
high-growth stock, a positive relation between book-to-market and illiquidity is consistent with a 
decrease in growth opportunities.  Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) show a significant positive relation 
between book-to-market and the illiquidity ratio. A result that is consistent with an increase in 
investment opportunities as liquidity increases. 
2.2. Bonds liquidity measures 
 
We construct many proxies for bonds liquidity using TRACE data. The first 3 measures are 
defined similar to Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012).  
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The Amihud illiquidity ratio is computed using high-frequency transaction data from 
TRACE, and is defined as the daily average of absolute returns divided by the trade size in millions 
of consecutive transactions, as ∑
|Pj−Pj−1|
Pj−1
Qj
Nt
J=1 .  
Also, Roll (1984) suggests that the effective bid-ask spread can be measured using return 
autocovariance. It is computed in this paper over a 21-day rolling interval (ending on day t) within 
fiscal year as 2√−cov (ΔPt − ΔPt+1). The daily auto covariance is more likely to be positive for 
heavily traded stocks, so when we encounter a positive autocovariance, we make it zero. It is applied 
to daily data based on the assumption that the daily closing price is likely to be similar for bids and 
asks prices.  
In addition, a proxy for roundtrip costs is the bid-ask spread, which is not available in 
TRACE before November 2008. An alternative measure of transaction costs, proposed by 
Feldhutter (2010), is calculated using unique roundtrip trades (URT). The spread is defined as 
P Max−P Min
P Max
. A daily estimate is the average of roundtrip costs on that day for different volumes, and 
then we average them to get the yearly measure. 
Similar to Roll (1984), Boa, pan and Wang (2011) develop illiquidity measure, 𝛾, defined as 
the negative of the autocovariance of the returns as −cov (ΔPt − ΔPt+1). 
2.3. Control variables 
 
A number of control variables, which have been identified by previous papers are employed 
as potential explanatory factors affecting investment decisions.  
As in Lins et al (2005), Muñoz (2013), and Alhassan et al. (2017), our control variables 
include the firm leverage. An increase in leverage would lower the debt capacity and firm’s ability to 
raise capital. Aivazian et al. (2005), Lins et al. (2005), Muñoz (2013), and Alhassan et al. (2017) and 
others show a negative relation between leverage and investments.  
It also includes size as a proxy for production, calculated as the logarithm of revenues. It can 
be argued that an increase in production would increase the investment. Lins et al. (2005) and 
Alhassan et al. (2017) find a positive significant relation between size and investments. 
In addition, we include Tobin’s Q as a control variable, measured by the ratio of market to 
book value of firm assets. Since Tobin’s Q reflects investment opportunities, it should be positive 
and significant. Chen and Zhao (2006) show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios have more 
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profitability and lower borrowing costs, which suggests that Tobin’s Q is similar to profitability in its 
effect. Lins et al (2005), Polk and Sapienza (2009), Muñoz (2013), and Alhassan et al. (2017) find a 
positive significant relation between Tobin’s Q and investments.  
In addition, we include cash flow as a control variable, measured by the sum of earnings 
before interest, tax and deprecation minus dividends, scaled by the total assets. Farazzi et al. (1988) 
argue that firms’ investment is positively related to their internal financing capability because 
external financing is costly. Lins et al. (2005), Almeida and Campello (2007), Muñoz (2013), and 
Alhassan et al. (2017) find a positive significant relation between CF and investments.  
Therefore, our final model is:  
Equation (1): Investment iτ = a  + b1 bonds illiquidity iτ +b2 stocks illiquidity iτ + b3 Size iτ + b4 FCF 
iτ +b4 Leverage iτ +b5 Tobin’s Q iτ +ε iτ  
Lag time period is used since the investment is not carried out immediately. Based on the 
main hypothesis, the parameter β1 and β2 are negative and significant, indicating that an increase in 
illiquidity would cause a decrease in investment by the firm, because liquidity facilitates financing of 
investment. Also, by dividing firms according to their financial constraints, it should be observed 
that an increase in financial constraints would make firms more sensitive to illiquidity.  
 
Table 12 Descriptive Analyses 
Panel A presents the means, medians, standard deviations for each variable included in the study. We take the log of 
Amihud measure plus one to avoid outliers. Roll (1984) defined as the square root of negative autocovariance computed 
over a 21-day rolling interval (ending on day t) within fiscal year. Boa, pan and Wang (2011) defined as the negative of 
the autocovariance of the returns. Relative spread is max-min spread relative to an estimate of max price. Size is defined 
as log of revenues. Tobin’s q is computed as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt (total market 
value) divided by total assets. Leverage is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. Profit is defined as net 
earning scaled by the beginning revenue. Panel B shows the pairwise Pearson's correlation between variables included in 
the study. For each correlation coefficient, the table reports the level of the statistical significance. The superscripts a, b, 
and c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median S.D Variable Mean Median S.D 
Bonds illiquidity Stocks illiquidity 
Amihud .00031 a .00227  .0143 Amihud 0.0125 0.0002 0.81 
Roll .0121 a .0056 .0699 Roll .0095 .0074 .0084 
BPW .0073 b 0    .266991 BPW .00006 .00001 .0011 
Relative spread .0083 a .006 .0078 Relative spread .0224 .0193  .0117 
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Panel A presents summary statistics associated with illiquidity measures for stocks and bonds 
markets and other control variables. It shows the means, medians, standard deviations for each 
variable included in the study. There are no substantial differences between the whole sample and a 
subsample restricted to investment-bond firms. The medians are similar to the means suggesting 
little skewness in liquidity distribution. As expected, it seems that volatility of illiquidity measured by 
standard deviation is higher in the stocks market than the bonds market. Comparing the bonds 
illiquidity measures and stocks illiquidity measures shows inconsistency in terms of which market 
exhibit the highest illiquidity. The reason for that as we mentioned above is that these measures 
exhibit inconsistency among them and do not capture all illiquidity aspects. The inconsistency 
between illiquidity measures is apparent in the correlation results between them on panel B. 
However, most of illiquidity measures show that bonds market is more liquid. The relative decrease 
of bond illiquidity comparing to stocks illiquidity is because adverse selection is not a major concern 
in bond markets and is more important in individual stocks due to idiosyncratic shocks, as Chordia 
et al (2003) point out.  
Table Continued        
Control Variables     Control Variables    
Size  8.869 8.847 1.47 Tobin’s q 1.084 .8492 .9359 
Leverage .2316 .2129 .1517 Capital Expenditure .0580 .0394 .0642 
FCF  .2229 .1894   .1946 Net profit .0201 .0398 .2496 
        
Panel B: Whole Sample 
Variable Amihud Roll BPW 
Relative 
spread 
Amihud 
stocks 
Roll 
stocks 
BPW 
stocks 
Relative 
spread 
stocks 
Size Leverage FCF Tobin’s q Cap. 
Amihud 1             
Roll .028 a 1            
BPW .26 a .557 a 1           
Relative 
spread 
-.0003a .005 -.005 1          
Amihud 
stocks 
.0049 .001 -.001 .0003 1         
Roll stocks .007 .037
a
 -.0005 .016 b .0965 a 1        
BPW stocks -.0000 .005 -.0003 .0017 .0112 .6610 a 1       
Relative 
spread stocks 
.0094 .092 a .017 b .023 
a
 .0476 a .396 a .026 a 1      
Size -.031 a -.066 a -.029 a -.0108 -.0261 a -.1195 a -.0085 -.3383 1     
Leverage -.018 b .0015 .0010 -.0072 .0077 .0417a -.0020 .1907 a -.2595 a 1    
FCF .0542 a .0081 .0173 c -.0424 a -.0226 b -.039 a -.0063 -.1083 a .156 a -.1147 a 1   
Tobin’s q .0254 a -.0020 -.0012 -.0076 -.0056 -.055 a -.0100 -.1236 a -.103 a -.0206 b .570 a 1  
Cap. -0.004 -.007 -.005 -.0189 a -.0049 .0022 -.0024 .0430 a -.1126 a -.0148 -.016 c .1014 a 1 
              
 39 
Panel B presents summary statistics for correlations between variables included in the study. 
The most important result is the apparent low correlation between the two markets illiquidity. 
Chordia et al (2003) find that there is a little correlation in liquidity between the two markets. Also, 
Campbell and Ammer (1993) find that the unconditional correlation between stock and bonds 
returns is low. They argue that stocks and bonds covariance should be low since the only common 
factor is interest rate, which has low variability. Moreover, as suggested by Borensztein and Gelos 
(2003) individual investors’ herding behavior that typically causes higher correlations in stocks 
market is unlikely to be a factor in bond market due to the high concentration of institutional 
investors who are less susceptible to herding behavior. 
However, many papers indicate that there are common factors that drive both markets 
causing a covariance between the two markets. Innovations and trading activity might cause an 
interaction between stocks and bonds market liquidity and a shift in portfolios between the two 
markets. Fleming et al (1998) show that volatility affects both markets, which can affect liquidity in 
both markets. Also, Chordia et al (2003) find that innovation in one market increases the spreads in 
both markets. However, the innovation is not necessary affecting both markets equally or on the 
same magnitude. Chordia et al (2003) find that monetary easing has only a significant positive effect 
on stocks liquidity during crisis periods.  
Beber et al. (2009) observe that illiquidity differs based on the bonds maturities and find a 
stronger correlation between illiquidity of stocks and short-term bonds. Similarly, Goyenko and 
Ukhov (2009) find a liquidity connection between stocks and treasury bonds returns that is more 
pronounced for short-term maturities. 
David and Veronesi (2013) and Campbell et al (2013) show that covariance of stocks and 
treasuries bonds returns turned from being positive before 2000 to being negative after that. They 
offer an explanation for the changing sign, which is the role of inflation especially during recessions. 
High expected inflation causes a positive covariance between stocks and bonds and vice versa. 
During the financial crisis, bonds market provided insurance against severe adverse economic 
conditions. In addition, Connolly et al (2005) find that the covariance negativity increases in a period 
of high stocks volatility and argue that the explanation is the investors seeking safety in bonds 
market. Also, Campbell et al (2014) offer another explanation to the time variation in the covariance, 
which is the response to monetary policy changes and the change in risk aversion, particularly in bad 
times.  
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However, papers trying to explain the relation between bonds and stocks illiquidity using 
firms’ level data are scarce. Nieto and Rodriguez (2015) try to narrow this gap by employing bond 
transaction prices from TRACE and find that the correlations between individual bonds and stocks 
returns are small and time variant. They also find that the correlation is negative with systematic firm 
risk, and positive with idiosyncratic risk.  
We try to investigate the causality between the two markets illiquidity for all measures. The 
Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald tests in Table 13 mostly indicate inconsistent results. Amihud’s 
(2002) bonds illiquidity measure strongly negative Granger causes stock illiquidity. However, using 
the spread measure, the causality is reversed. The stock illiquidity measured by relative spread 
strongly positively Granger causes bonds illiquidity. Also, there is no bidirectional causality between 
the two markets using Roll or BPW. Interestingly, when we investigate the causality between the two 
markets illiquidity during the financial crisis. The Amihud’s (2002) bonds illiquidity measure strongly 
positively Granger causes stock illiquidity. And the stock illiquidity measured by relative spread 
strongly negatively Granger causes bonds illiquidity. Therefore, the signs are flipped.  
Table 13 Panel vector autoregresssion - whole sample 
 
Table states the expected sign for each independent variable. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
  Regressor Dependent Variable in VAR 
 Amihud S. Amihud 
Amihud .0624 a -.0650 a 
S. Amihud  -.0081 1.213 a 
  
 Roll S. Roll 
Roll .1831 .0011 
S. Roll .9767 .6757 
  
 Spread bonds Spread stocks 
Spread bonds   .07383 c   .000 
Spread stocks   27.91 a   .9775 a 
  
 BPW bonds BPW stocks 
BPW bonds .04534 .0000 
BPW stocks 12.825 .3576 
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3. Main Findings 
 
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the results from the regression analyses. 
We begin with the results from the fixed effect panel models. Later, we show the findings for the 
role of financial constraints on the leverage and liquidity relation. 
As previously outlined, we estimate Equation (1) on an annual basis where we include firms’ 
dummies to capture the heterogeneity across firms and to ameliorate the endogeneity issue. Also, 
based on the main hypotheses, the bonds and stocks illiquidity coefficients should be negative and 
significant, indicating that an increase in bonds and stock illiquidity would cause a decrease in 
investment by the firm.  
All tables show the results of coefficients and R-squares from those fixed effect panel 
regressions, number of observations, and expected sign for each variable. For each table, we report 
the results of 5 models where we include different bonds illiquidity measures. To individually test the 
null hypothesis that the independent variable coefficients are equal zero, we report the subscripts a, 
b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. We use Huber-White 
corrected standard errors when computing the p-values to account for the possible presence of 
heteroskedasticity. The results are the same when we use robust standard errors corrected for firm-
level clustering.  
In Table 14, where the dependent variable is investment proxied by 4 measures. It appears 
that there is a significant negative relation between investment measures and bonds illiquidity 
measures in the prior year. It shows statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level or higher. 
Therefore, a firm’s future investments increase in its bonds liquidity. Also, the consistency among 
the different measures of bonds illiquidity’s magnitude is apparent except for relative spread, which 
shows a higher magnitude. Also, it shows that there is a significant negative relation between 
investment measures and stock illiquidity measure in the prior year. It shows statistically significant 
coefficients at the 5% level or higher. Thus, a firm’s future investments increase in its stocks 
liquidity. Also, the economic magnitude of the stocks illiquidity effect is meaningful since it is higher 
than the bonds illiquidity effect. In fact, it seems that the stock illiquidity effect is the highest among 
all explanatory variables, and it has a higher effect than bonds illiquidity.  
In terms of book-to-market, a measure to investment opportunities, the stock and bonds 
illiquidity show significant positive results. Thus, similar to Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) who find 
a significant positive relation between book-to-market and the stock illiquidity ratio, we find a 
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significant positive relation between book-to-market and the bonds and stocks illiquidity ratio. A 
result that is consistent with an increase in investment opportunities as liquidity increases. 
The results of control variables are consistent with prior studies. Investment is positively 
related to size at a significant level. The positive relation between investment and size is consistent 
with assumption that size is a proxy for production and an increase in production would 
consequently increase the investment.  
Also, leverage is negatively related to investment at a significant level except when the 
investment is measured by book to market. The negativity between investment and illiquidity is 
because leverage would lower the firm’s debt capacity and firm’s ability to raise capital.  
The results show that free cash flow is significant and has a positive effect on all measures of 
investment. Consistent with Farazzi et al. (1988) argument that firms’ investment is positively related 
to their internal financing capability because external financing is costly.  
Tobin’s Q or the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets shows 
significant positve relation with all investment measures. Since Tobin’s Q reflects investment 
opportunities, it should be positive and significant.  
Table 14 Fixed panel Regressions of Future Investments  
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Investment = 𝛼 + 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity+ 𝛽 stocks illiquidity + 𝛽 FCF+ 
𝛽 Leverage + 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝜀.The table states the expected sign for each independent variable. Full definitions 
of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 12 Panel A. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for firm-level 
clustering. 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment  
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.01811 a -0.0162 a -.5577 a -.0059 a 
Stock illiquidity  - -.3168 b -0.9673 b -.7975 b -.3178 b 
Size  + .0145 a 0.0145 a .01242 b .01455 b 
FCF + .03561 b 0.0421 a .04108 b .0364 a 
Leverage - -.06115 a -0.0602 a -.0572 a -.0613 a 
Tobin’s Q + .01748 a 0.0160 a .01487 a .01754 a 
R2  0.0119 .0148 0.0157 0.0119 
OBS  3,984 3,986 3,986 3,972 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets  
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.01531 a -.01357 a -.2494 a -.0015  
Stock illiquidity - -.3133 a -.3107 a -.2376 b -.3143 a 
Size + .0035 c .0036 c .0028 .0035 c 
FCF + .0337 a .0345 a .0335 a .0338 a 
Leverage - -.04387 a -.0439 a -.0427 a -.0437 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0079 a .0079 a .0075 a .0080 a 
R2  0.0992 0.1016 0.1043 0.0994 
OBS  4,140 4,140 4,140 4,126 
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In Table 15, we add to the base equation the financial constraint dummy interacted with the 
bonds illiquidity variable to capture the effect of financial constraints. We use firm size, firm 
leverage, firm payout ratio, Kaplan and Zingales (1997)’s index, rating, and stock illiquidity. On an 
annual basis, we rank firms by the financial constraints into four quartiles. Then, we create a dummy 
variable that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top quartile and zero otherwise.  
The results of regressions show that more financially constrained firms have a high-
pronounced effect of bonds illiquidity, indicating that market imperfections have high effect on 
financially constrained firms.   
Specifically, the results from the inclusion of the variable that represents the interaction 
between bonds illiquidity and a dummy for large firms are positive and statistically significant across 
all models. The significant positivity shows that large firms are less vulnerable to capital market 
imperfections since they are more known and have more access to external market. Also, the 
interaction variable between illiquidity and an indicator for high leverage firms is negative and 
statistically significant in all models, indicating that market imperfection is more pronounced for 
high leverage firms since it would lower firm’s debt capacity and their ability to raise capital.   
Similarly, the results from using high payout ratio as an indicator for financial constraints are 
consistent with the hypothesis that bonds illiquidity would have a low effect on firms with high 
internal finance capacity. The interaction between bonds illiquidity and a dummy for high payout 
ratio firms are positive and statistically significant across all models. Also, the results from Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997)’s index interacted with bonds illiquidity is negative and significant across all 
Table Continued  
Dependent Variable:  Book To market 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity + 1.491  .4378 b 14.17 b .0883 a 
Stock illiquidity  + .2355 a .1029 c 13.60 b .1035 c 
Size + .5676 a .5256 a .5975 a .5282 a 
FCF - -1.705 a -.8258 c -.8674 b -.8356 c 
Leverage + -.4955 .0664 -.0833 .0707 
Tobin’s Q - -.3117 a -.3272 a -.2345 a -.3217 a 
R2  0.0198 0.0167 0.0236 0.0165 
OBS    3,310 4,256   4,761 4,241 
Dependent Variable:  Acquisition 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0566 a -.0062 a -.2423 c -.006 a 
Stock illiquidity - -.1892 b -.1734 a -.1331 a -.1302 a 
Size + -.01749 a -.0127 a --.0183 a -.0171 a 
FCF + .0556 a .01913 a .0521 b .0527 b 
Leverage - -.0422 -.0525 a -.0495 b -.0359 c 
Tobin’s Q + .0106 a .0108 a .0120 a .01294 a 
R2  0.0295 0.0264 .03333 0.0329 
OBS  3,790 3,094 3,367 3,354 
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models, indicating a higher sensitivity from the financially constrained firms to the effect of 
illiquidity, similar to the leverage effect.  
Moreover, the results from the interaction between a dummy variable for firms with high 
stock illiquidity and bonds illiquidity measures are negative and significant across all measures, 
indicating that market imperfections represented by bonds illiquidity is more pronounced for firms 
suffering from high stock illiquidity.  In addition, the results from the interaction between a dummy 
variable for firms with junk bonds and bonds illiquidity measures are negative and significant across 
all measures, indicating that market imperfections have higher effect on firms with below-grade 
bonds. Finally, these results are indicators of the robustness of our findings, which suggest that the 
effect of bonds illiquidity on investment is more prominent in the more financially constrained 
firms. 
Table 15 Fixed panel Regressions: Financial constraints 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Investment= 𝛼 + 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity+ 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity* Financial 
constraint + 𝛽 stocks illiquidity + 𝛽 Leverage + 𝛽 size + 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝛽 FCF + 𝜀.The table states the expected sign for 
each independent variable. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 12 
Panel A.  The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are 
robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0544 a -.0140 a -.5104 b 
Bonds illiquidity * size + .0442 a .0264 a .4619 b 
Stock illiquidity - -.7525 a -.7705 a -.6124 a 
Size  + .0111 b   .0110 b .0115 b 
FCF +   .0619 a .0604 b .0492 b 
Leverage - -.0429 b -.0433 b -.0471 a 
Tobin’s Q +   .0144 a .0144 a .0158 a 
R2  0.0161 0.0167 0.0175 
OBS  3,987 3,987 4,451 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0428 a -.0104 a -.2436 a 
Bonds illiquidity * size +   .0328 a    .0195 a .2182 a 
Stock illiquidity - -.3199 a -.3324 a -.2534 a 
Size  + -.0003 -.0004 .0002 
FCF + .0656 a .0645 a .0593 a 
Leverage - -.0165 b -.0167 b -.0170 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0061 a   .0062 a .0065 a 
R2  0.1118   0.1191 0.1071   
OBS  4,134 4,134 4,620 
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Table Continued 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0203 a -.0165 a -.2485 
Bonds illiquidity * leverage - -.2648 a -.0163 c -1.0227 b 
Stock illiquidity  - -.5919 a -.7475 a -.5378 a 
Size  + .0240 a .0112 b .0120 b 
FCF + .0517 b   .0621 a   .0500 b 
Leverage - -.0329 c -.0431 b -.0368 b 
Tobin’s Q + .0173 a .0143 a .0157 a 
R2  0.0201 0.0163 0.0177 
OBS  4,038 3,987 4,451 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0114 b -.0122 a -.1345 b 
Bonds illiquidity * leverage - -.0045 a -.0101 b -.3012 b 
Stock illiquidity - -.3666 a -.3167 a -.2226 a 
Size  + -.0013 -.0002 .0003 
FCF + .0695 a .0658 a .0598 a 
Leverage - -.0200 a -.0166 b -.0138 b 
Tobin’s Q + .0066 a   .0061 a .0064 a 
R2  0.1291 0.1138   0.1058 
OBS  3,667 4,134 4,620 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.8731 a -.0126 b -.5404 b 
Bonds illiquidity * payout + .8642 a .0175 a .5667  
Stock illiquidity  - -.7992 a -.9087 a -.9018 b 
Size  + .0257 a   .0103 .0277 a 
FCF + .0043   .0431 c .0255 
Leverage - -.1178 a -.1161 a -.1069 b 
Tobin’s Q + .0152 a .0143 a   .0151 a 
R2  0.0232   0.0205 0.0223 
OBS  3,945 3,978 3,579 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.3171 b -.0110 a -.2949 a 
Bonds illiquidity * payout + .3076 b   .0143 b .1834 c 
Stock illiquidity  - -.3843 a -.4194 a -.2710 a 
Size  + .0008 -.0049 b -.0054 a 
FCF + .0370 a .0333 a .0509 a 
Leverage - -.0445 a -.0414 a -.0322 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0064 a .0060 a .0055 a 
R2  0.1125 0.1216   0.1311 
OBS  4,126 4,128 4,134 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0098 c -.0148 b .4580 
Bonds illiquidity * Index - -1.238 a -.5515 b -.9041 a 
Stock illiquidity  - -.7864a -.7536 a -.9062 a 
Size  + .0255 a   .0237 a .0110 
FCF + .0319 .0320   .0425 b 
Leverage - -.1169 a -.1193 a -.1112 b 
Tobin’s Q + .0139 a   .0141 a .0152 a 
R2  0.0237 0.0241 0.0215 
OBS  3,965 4,046 3,978 
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Table Continued 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0199 a -.0118 a -.0928 
Bonds illiquidity * Index - -.9717 a   -.2259 b -.2335 b 
Stock illiquidity  - -.3915 a -.3775 a -.3513 b 
Size  + -.0047 c -.0011 -.0050 c 
FCF + .0356 a   .0363 a   .0352 a 
Leverage - -.0429 a -.0445 a -.0408 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0062 a .0063 a   .0059 a 
R2  0.1165   0.1155 0.1182 
OBS     4,084 4,128 4,084 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0125 -.0089 -.0639 
Bonds illiquidity* Stock illiquidity - -1.317 c -.0229 a -.6177 c 
Stock illiquidity  - -.8557 a -.8419 a -.5527 a 
Size  + .0190 .0083   .0189 
FCF + .0535 c   .0928 a   .0523 c 
Leverage - -.1239 a   -.1108 a -.1200 a 
Tobin’s Q +   .01465 .0122 a .0143 a 
R2  0.0228   0.0226   0.0234 
OBS  4,047 3,979 4,047 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0207 a   .0016 -.0424 
Bonds illiquidity* Stock illiquidity -   -1.153 c -.0180 a -.2409 b 
Stock illiquidity  - -.4110 a -.3503 a -.2719 a 
Size  + -.0061 a -.0014 -.0047 
FCF + .0319 a .0538 a .0344 a 
Leverage - -.0401 a -.0452 a -.0415 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0057 a   .0061 a   .0061 a 
R2  0.1218    0.1202   0.1190   
OBS    4,128   4,130 4,128 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.2280  -.0059 b -.5599 
b 
Bonds illiquidity* Rating - -.0230   -.03179 c -.9500 b 
Stock illiquidity  - -.4868 b -.3374 b -.1686 
Size  + -.0123 -.0056 -.0171 b 
FCF + -.0362 -.1632 -.0794 
Leverage - -.0609 a -.0520 c   -.0592 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0217 a .0770 c .0714 c 
R2  0.0165 0.0452 0.0390   
OBS  5,592 7,811 7,805 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative Spread 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0135 a -.0001 -.3684 b 
Bonds illiquidity * Rating - -.0093 a -.0176 c -.1180 b 
Stock illiquidity  - -.2953 a -.3117 a -.2356 a 
Size  + -.0068 a   -.0062 a -.0047 b 
FCF + .0216 b   .0374 a .0490 a 
Leverage -   -.0289 a -.0201 a -.0287 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0085 a    .0077 a   .0048 a 
R2  0.0699 0.0727 0.0934   
OBS  8,186 9,367 6,782 
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4. Robustness  
 
We do not confine our results to a specific measure of leverage or illiquidity and show that our 
results are robust for all measures. Also, we address the issue of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation by using Huber-White corrected standard errors when computing the p-values and 
got robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
In this section, we also address different issues, specifically, endogeneity, stability over time, and 
the difference between investment and junk bonds in terms of liquidity.  
4.1. Endogeneity  
 
In all our models, we use fixed effect models, which make important differences in the 
estimation of coefficients. Also, fixed effect models make important differences since one of the 
most common reasons for endogeneity in corporate finance is omitted variables as a result of the 
heterogeneity.  In a setting aimed at understanding firm behavior, any time-invariant variable that are 
not observed in the data, such as unobservable technological differences across firms, could 
contribute to the presence of a fixed effect. Using fixed effect model in panel data can ameliorate 
this issue as suggested by Roberts and Whited (2013). 
4.1.1. Heckman (1976) test for sample selection bias 
 
In addition, to address the endogeneity resulted from sample selection bias, Heckman (1976) 
introduced the Heckman model, a two-stage approach for data analysis. The results of the Heckman 
(1979) are not reported for brevity. The result show that that Inverse Mills Ratio is insignificant, 
bonds illiquidity is negative with (-.01270) and significant at the 10% level, and stocks illiquidity is 
negative with (-.0087) and significant suggesting that our findings are robust. We also get similar 
results when investment is defined as capital expenditure scaled by total assets.    
4.1.2. GMM Test 
 
In addition, we estimate dynamic GMM regressions to address the endogeneity concerns. We 
use the dynamic GMM estimator. Two lags of investment are sufficient to capture the dynamic 
endogeneity. The main result of the GMM estimate still shows a negative effect of bonds illiquidity 
on investment (-.0078) at 5% significance and a negative effect of stocks illiquidity on investment (-
.01615) at 1% significance. There is no substantial difference in employing different measures of 
investment like capital expenditure scaled by total assets.  
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4.1.3. Granger causality 
 
Moreover, we try to explicitly investigate the causality between the investment and bonds 
and stocks illiquidity for all measures using the Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test. The results 
mostly indicate bonds illiquidity significantly Granger causes investment, while investment does not 
Granger cause bonds illiquidity. Interestingly, there is no significant causality between stocks 
illiquidity measure and investment except for spread relative measure. It appears that the casualty 
tests are sensitive to how the investment or illiquidity is measured. However, casualty tests are 
consistent whether we include financial crisis period or restrict the sample to investment-grade 
bonds.   
 
Table 16 Panel vector autoregresssion- whole sample 
Table states the expected sign for each independent variable where investment is Capital Expenditure scaled by net 
property plant and equipment. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  
The results are robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
 
4.2. Stability over time  
 
In this section, we test the stability of our main results over time since several studies document 
a change in market liquidity during the time of financial crisis. Friewald et al. (2012) and Dick-
Nielsen et al. (2012) among others find that US corporate bonds liquidity significantly plummeted 
during the financial crisis in 2008. During the financial crisis, credit quality and liquidity’s fall 
increase yield spreads, decrease investors’ portfolio values, and increase firms’ financing costs. Also,  
Therefore, considering the results of significant liquidity deterioration for corporate bonds 
during the financial crisis in 2008, we repeat our initial analysis for the same sample excluding the 
financial crisis period (2008) as in Friewald et al. (2012).  
Regressor Dependent in VAR Regressor Dependent in VAR 
  Amihud Investment  S.Amihud Investment 
Amihud .0080 a .0021 a S.Amihud .3004 .0045 
Investment -.0145 .5188 a Investment .01417 .5311 a 
    
 Roll Investment  S.Roll Investment 
Roll .3946 .0042 S.Roll .3691 a -.0949 
Investment .0757   .6424 a Investment -.0245  .6517 a 
    
 Spread Investment  S.Spread Investment 
Spread .1667 c -.2833 a S.Spread .6796 a -.3376 a 
Investment -.0175 .4818 a Investment -.0185 .5401 a 
    
 BPW Investment  S.BPW Investment 
BPW .1998 a .00009 a S.BPW   -.020 .02843 
Leverage  .0534 .64474 a Investment   -.0076 .5427 a 
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The results are not affected by the exclusion of financial crisis period, indicating stability of our 
results through time. The results show a significant negative relation between investment measures 
and bonds and stocks illiquidity measures. Thus, firms with high bonds and stocks illiquidity choose 
a lower level of investment. In addition, we control for time effect by adding a time trend and the 
results for bonds and stock illiquidity are not affected.  
4.3. Stability across samples: difference between investment and junk bonds 
When dealing with bonds market, the firms can be classified into high-investment-grade firms, 
and below-investment-grade firms. Several papers indicate a different behavior of liquidity between 
the two grades firms. Dick-Nielsen et al (2012) show that illiquidity increased during the subprime 
crisis and is more pronounced and less persistent for below-investment-grade bonds. In addition, 
Bessembinder et al. (2016) suggest that below-investment-grade bonds are more dependence on 
market liquidity as a result of their high exposure to asymmetric information. Kisgen and Strahan 
(2010) and Bessembinder et al. (2016) point out that institutional investors and insurance companies 
are usually required to only invest into investment-grade firms. Also, Chen et al. (2007) find that 
bonds illiquidity has a significant positive increase on yield spreads and is more pronounced for junk 
bonds.  
Therefore, we repeat our initial analysis for the whole sample by including the below-
investment-grade firms. The results show consistent results for the main variables with no material 
difference, that firms with high bonds and stocks illiquidity choose a lower level of investment. 
However, the significance of stocks and bonds illiquidity coefficients is less.  Also, defining the 
investment as book to market shows inconsistent results. More importantly, the sign and 
significance of size and tangibility in general are inconsistent with our initial results.  
Table 17 Fixed panel Regressions of Future Investments – whole sample 
This table reports annual regressions of equation: Investment = 𝛼 + 𝛽 Bonds illiquidity+ 𝛽 stocks illiquidity + 𝛽 FCF+ 
𝛽 Leverage + 𝛽 size+ 𝛽 Tobin’s q+ 𝜀.The table states the expected sign for each independent variable. Full definitions 
of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 12 Panel A. The subscripts a, b, c refer to 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.  The results are robust standard errors corrected for firm-level 
clustering. 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by net property plant and equipment  
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0080 c -.0287 -.3023 -.0004 a 
Stock illiquidity - -.2260 c -.2998 c -.2967  -.2122 
Size + -.0087 -.0146 -.0146 -.0115 
FCF + -.1502 -.1406    -.1464 -.0582 a 
Leverage - -.0612 c -.0743 a -.0732 a .0776 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0779 c   .0668 a .0665 a    .0776 c 
Rating Up    .0039 -.0013 -.0018 .0069 
R2  .0474  .0407 .0408 .0418 
OBS  6,955 8,246 8,246   6,868 
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Table Continued 
 
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditure scaled by total assets  
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0043 c -.0031  -.0563 c -.0002 a 
Stock illiquidity  - -.0724 c -.0718 c -.084 b -.0766 c 
Size  + -.0049 b   -.0049 b -.0046 b -.0033 
FCF + .0434 a   .0434 a .0434 b   .0474 b 
Leverage - -.0261 a -.0261 a -.0299 a -.0268 b 
Tobin’s Q + .0089 a .0089 a .0098 a   .0097 a 
Rating Up  .0014   .0014 .0004 .0013 
R2  0.0614 0.0615 0.0659 0.0675 
OBS  7,591 7,591 6,985 6,261 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Book To market 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity + 1.496 b -2.009  40.64 -.1237 
Stock illiquidity  + 95.09   102.7 c 17.48 87.35 
Size  + .6569 .6105 .4518 .4227 
FCF - 1.885   1.484   23.66 c   1.540 
Leverage + 24.96 c   19.63   20.04 c 20.53 c 
Tobin’s Q + -.6688 -.6883 -.7965  -.8129 
Rating Up  1.428 c   1.213 c    .9888   1.001 
R2  0.0081 0.0075 0.0073   0.0078   
OBS  6,360 7,587 6,966 8,140 
Dependent Variable:  Acquisition 
Variables  Expected sign Amihud Roll  
 
Relative 
Spread 
BPW 
Bonds illiquidity - -.0225 c -.0082 a -.0723 b -.0013 a 
Stock illiquidity  - -.1449 b -.1463 b -.1985 a -.1374 b 
Size  + -.0170 a -.0172 a -.0149 a -.0169 a 
FCF +   .0140 b .0141 b -.0381 a   .0153 b 
Leverage - -.0556 a -.0559 a .0075 a -.0570 a 
Tobin’s Q + .0116 a .0115 a   .0272 a   .0112 a 
Rating Up    .0071 c   .0071 c .0043 .0063 
R2  0.0311 0.0316 0.0276 0.0302 
OBS  5,032 5,032    7,167   4,938 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Employing bonds and stocks illiquidity models developed by the market microstructure 
literature, we investigate if markets illiquidity is a significant determinant of investment decisions.  
We hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, a firm’s future investments increase in its bonds and 
stocks liquidity. We hypothesize that an increase in investment opportunities due to an increase in 
bonds liquidity is for the decrease of the firm’s cost of capital and the decrease in its issuance cost. 
We also hypothesize that firms with more financially constraints will benefit more from the bonds 
liquidity, as it makes it easier for them to borrow externally. Thus, we expect the effect of bonds 
illiquidity to be more pronounced on financially constrained firms due to the limited access for other 
external capital.  
The results show that, even after controlling for the firm characteristics that determine 
investment decisions, bonds and stock illiquidity affect the investment decisions of U.S. firms 
significantly over the sample period 2003-2018.  Specifically, the coefficients of bonds and stocks 
illiquidity are negative and strongly significant regardless of investment measurement. Also, both the 
sign and the significance of the coefficients for the conventional variables are consistent with 
previous literatures.  
Also, we find the effect of bonds illiquidity is more pronounced for financially constrained 
firms using different financial constraints measures.  
We also address different issues like endogeneity, stability over time, and the difference 
between investment and junk bonds in terms of liquidity, and find that the main results are robust 
and consistent.  
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